

# STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE

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
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*A former G-2 officer gives some personal views on how to multiply the value of a military intelligence asset.*

## **UNRECOGNIZED POTENTIAL IN THE MILITARY ATTACHÉS**

**Lyman B. Kirkpatrick**

The system of U.S. military attachés, a worldwide liaison service which today is accredited to 75 countries, including five behind the Iron Curtain, is one of the least well understood of the Government's intelligence arms. Probably because of this lack of understanding its great potentialities remain relatively untapped.

The military attachés have produced and are producing large amounts of intelligence information, and certain attaché reports have been of significant strategic value. The Army attaché in Tel Aviv correctly interpreted the Israeli mobilization of October 1956 as a war measure and determined the direction of the attack against Egypt. His prompt report, a key item in the intelligence which enabled the Watch Committee to alert the President to the impending Suez War, could be counted by itself a sufficient justification for the attaché system's entire budget for the year. Service reporting from behind the Iron Curtain has also been of incalculable value, and that from many other areas has provided information of importance.

As the attaché systems become recurrently the target of economy drives in the Department of Defense, however, the lack of knowledge in the proper places as to what the attachés produce for the intelligence community grows apparent. Attaché reports are not often singled out for distribution to high departmental policy levels. Most of them are inconspicuous elements of the routine reporting which keeps each military service up to date on the corresponding services of other countries. They contribute to the "finished intelligence" of the encyclopaedic National Intelligence Surveys; but officers at the policy level are unlikely ever to look at an NIS

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until, when a crisis hits, they have an immediate need for data on the Lebanese army or the Indonesian navy, and even then they do not necessarily remain conscious of the fact that it was the attachés who supplied these data. Nor is it always obvious at the policy level that there is a significant contribution from the military attaché system in nearly every National Intelligence Estimate.

It seems clear that the social rather than intelligence aspect of the military attachés' work is weighed too heavily at certain levels in the Pentagon. Hence the attachés are criticized as "cookie-pushers" assigned to duty on the cocktail circuit. It is true that the nature of the job in many capitals requires considerable social activity. In Washington itself, the papers abound with accounts of parties for or attended by the service attachés of the various foreign embassies. It may also be true that the attaché staffs occasionally include some too socially conscious or ambitious officers who devote themselves too assiduously to the kind of intelligence collection that is done over a glass. But that sort of thing can happen in any organization; it is something that can be remedied quite quickly and easily by command action.

It is important that a new dignity be given to the attaché system and a deserved respect accorded it. It is important that the still untapped reservoirs of information needed by the Government which are available to military attachés be recognized and exploited. There are new areas that need to be covered, and old ones that should be covered better. There are new horizons of opportunity, and new approaches that can be used to obtain intelligence of utmost value.

#### *Coverage and Cross Accreditation*

Today there are 761 U.S. staff personnel serving in the attaché systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force overseas. The Army has 429 (143 officers, 212 enlisted men, and 74 civilians), the Navy 161 (157 officers), the Air Force 171 (145 officers, 22 enlisted men, and 4 civilians). There are army attachés accredited to 73 countries, air attachés to 69, and naval attachés to 58. Army attachés are actually stationed in 69 countries, air attachés in 53, and naval attachés in 45.

It has been the policy to accredit one attaché to more than one country in order to economize in manpower, because the activities of some countries in some military fields are limited. For example, there are army attachés in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua; but Air Force interests in these four countries are handled by the air attaché in Guatemala, and naval matters in all five republics plus British Honduras are the responsibility of the naval attaché in Mexico City. There are other variations in service practices around the Caribbean. A naval attaché is stationed in the Dominican Republic, but the air attaché accredited to Ciudad Trujillo is stationed in Venezuela, and the army attaché comes over from Cuba. Haiti, on the other hand, has an army attaché in Port au Prince but is covered by the air attaché from Caracas and the naval attaché from Havana.

While there is certainly not enough work under present conditions in many of these places to keep separate attachés fully occupied, the system of cross accreditation does create some peculiarities. Thus in Havana, where the Air Force representative covers only Cuba, the Navy's covers Haiti in addition, and the Army's the Dominican Republic. Our military expertise on the Dominican Republic is partitioned among Ciudad Trujillo, Havana, and Caracas; a regional conference would have to be called to get the consensus of our on-the-spot representatives about the over-all strength of the Trujillo regime.

Sometimes the changing currents of international relations create some curious situations in this representation from outside, and changes have to be made in accreditation. At one point the United States had no service attachés in the Sudan, the representatives of all three services in Egypt being accredited also to Khartoum. With the Sudanese more than a little suspicious of Nasr's designs on their struggling young nation, this doubling raised obvious problems. Today there is an army attaché in Khartoum—a most important assignment with a military junta running the Sudan—and air affairs there are covered by the air attaché in Ethiopia.

Cross accreditation is of course economical, and it can be satisfactory in certain instances. But we should be aware that in this era of rising nationalism the armed services of



those countries not accorded resident attachés may consider themselves slighted and so feel more kindly—and cooperative—toward the major powers that do keep attachés in residence. It would be wasteful, to be sure, to assign naval attachés to the Sudan or Switzerland, but the most powerful and influential nation on earth should be able to afford at least one appropriate service attaché in every country that has a military force, however embryonic. That there will be more than enough to keep such officers actively and profitably employed I hope the following paragraphs will demonstrate.

*New Horizons*

One need only look at the number of countries where the military are today in full control, hold a dominant position, or at least exercise considerable political influence, in order to see the ascending potential of the role of the service attaché. Taking the world region by region and noting only the more important examples of this situation, we find in Europe General de Gaulle master of France, General Franco running Spain, and Marshal Tito ruling Yugoslavia, all of them dependent in one degree or another on support from the army; in the Middle East Egypt's Nasr and Iraq's Kasem, army officers brought to power by military coups; in Africa Haile Selassie of Ethiopia relying on the loyalty of his imperial bodyguard and the Sudan run by a military junta; in Asia the governments of Laos, Pakistan, and Burma subject to the will of the military and Indonesia pivoting on the key position of the army; in Latin America the army *not* the dominant factor in domestic politics only by exception from the rule.

In such countries, and in countries where the military may in future emerge as a powerful political force, the officers of the military services become a prime intelligence source and target. The U.S. service attaché has as his first obligation, of course, the development of contact with officers on the chief-of-staff level of the service to which he is accredited. But the circumstances of the coup in Iraq point up the need for getting to know also the ambitious and rising young officers who through ability or good fortune may achieve prominence at some future time. The attachés could by this means insure, not an advance warning of all future coups, but that there would be fewer surprises.

It is acknowledged that in many countries a too obvious or aggressive cultivating of friendships with military personnel by U.S. attachés would be viewed with disfavor—and probably recognized for the surreptitious probing that it was. Some ingenuity and long-range planning would be required here. Initially the attaché might be able only to spot upcoming young officers who should be approached later, perhaps by others, particularly since in many countries those that carry a political thrust are kept in provincial garrisons away from the capital. Sometimes the embassy, using the country-team system, could have people outside the attaché's immediate office make the initial contact, develop the necessary rapport, or maintain a relationship which had been established.

But a main avenue of long-term approach to future wielders of power starts in the United States. Every year hundreds of foreign military officers attend U.S. service schools. Perhaps not all of these will reach chief-of-staff level, but the expectation that they will achieve senior rank is implicit in their selection for the expensive visit to the United States. Consider, for example, that Admiral Larrazabal, who headed the junta that governed Venezuela between the overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez regime and the election of Betancourt, had attended the U.S. Naval War College at Newport.

We have thus an ideal opportunity to establish personal relationships that could in the future keep us informed on affairs of critical intelligence interest. I am not talking about recruitment of these officers as agents; it is a matter of developing the conviction in a foreign officer that his, your, his country's, and the United States' interests are all identical, or so very close that it would be to his country's advantage, or at least not to its detriment, for him to confide in you.

First, there should be a thorough, methodical system at the school for developing biographical data on each individual officer—not just the usual personal history statement or biographical sketch, but knowledge of the likes and dislikes of the man and what makes him tick. Did his father fight with the Khalifa against Kitchener at Omdurman? Does he drink heavily, have occasional sprees or amatory adventures? Is he ashamed he can't afford a better home, feel he can't enter-

tain Americans? What are his cultural interests—music, Goethe, chess? Has he been discriminated against because of his race? Where does he want to end his career—as chief of staff? as constitutionally elected president? as dictator? or as a professional officer who has served his country well? And how does he see the future development of his own country? Which great powers does he think can best help it?

Much of this information can be assembled by the faculty of the school in question. But intimate insight into a man's character, and especially the establishment of a rapport that would yield continuing intelligence dividends, would require that as often as feasible and practical the U.S. officer destined to be assigned to a country become a classmate of its potentially influential students at a U.S. service school. The identity of interest among classmates creates a strong bond.

If a foreign officer attends a U.S. school it can be assumed that his English is passable. But this should not lead to any relaxing of the attaché's effort to acquire fluency in the language of the country to which he is assigned. The psychological advantage of knowing the language is tremendous. An intelligence officer's objectives are much easier to reach if his foreign contact senses in him not a superficial, self-seeking interest but a true and deep understanding based upon knowledge of the country's language, history, and customs and an appreciation of its people. Such specialization, it is true, implies a relatively long assignment at the post in question.

The full implications of this long-range approach for the personal career of a military attaché may appear rather formidable in terms of present-day concepts. A year or two spent learning language, area, and customs, a year or more at a service school to cultivate the friendship of a foreign officer, and at least a double tour of duty in one country—these may add up to a third or a half of the U.S. officer's entire active military career. But if we are serious about our intelligence effort, this is a way to give new significance and worth to the attaché system, and the long-term benefits should certainly be high.

*A radical proposal for controlling the substance of routine information reports from overseas and getting them promptly to consumers.*

## DESIGN FOR JET-AGE REPORTING

William Earling

Transmitting information from its variegated and far-flung collectors to users in the complex intelligence community is necessarily a tremendously complicated business. In our present situation the natural complexity is compounded by our having been content to handle nonpriority materials by means evolved with little change from communication systems of the archaic past in separate departments and agencies. In 1900 the few copies of dispatches from abroad required in Washington could be supplied by carbon copies typed in an embassy and forwarded by ship pouch. The only improvements we have introduced for routine reports since then are to use mats or stencils instead of carbon paper and to forward them by air instead of by sea.

Given the vastly increased volume of reporting, this speed-up in means of transportation has not been able to prevent a net slow-down in the flow of information. Dispatches are still directed back to parent departments in Washington through many separate channels. There are departmental reviews, revisions, retypings, reproduction. Mail rooms and secretariats distribute them to other interested departments and agencies, which in turn route them by messenger to subordinate components. At every stage they queue up in front of logs and registers. The average transmission time for routine reports has come to be measured in months, and some stray documents take more than a year to make their way through the maze.

It is true that the community is not suffering critically from delay in receipt of priority information transmitted by radio and cable. Although much of our rapid communications system is also archaic, radical improvements have been

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made in some segments. Others are needed and possible, but this article will limit its concern to routine dispatches and information reports. For them we need a new, much faster system, though not necessarily so fast or so expensive as for cables.

The model intelligence reporting system would connect all components of the community through one integrated communications network. This network would have the capacity to move all intelligence from reporter to consumer within, say, 24 hours. It would have standard, streamlined, automatic procedures for handling information at both ends of the line, with no room for backlogs, personal procrastination, or processing delay.

This model is something we can aim at, but we must begin at some modest and practical beginning. Let us then examine the design of a not too expensive system to speed the sluggish flow of information reports from overseas perhaps not fifty-fold but ten. Most analysts would find it not bad to be sure of getting all routine information, down to the lowest priority, within a week of its dispatch.

#### *Triplicate Problem*

The time required for the many processing steps that intervene between reporter and consumer, a time exponentially increased with volume as each report waits its turn at each processing station, is central to our problem, but it is not the whole problem. If we concentrate on the mechanics of getting pieces of paper from point to point as fast as possible without considering their substantive purport we are ignoring one side of the coin. That the current volume of reporting is outgrowing our ability to handle and use it effectively is manifest not only in unacceptable delays but in consumer complaints that they receive too many reports they do not need while failing to receive information they do need. Collecting components retort that consumers fail to let them know through standard evaluation procedures which of their reports are useless and to keep them informed through the standard placing of requirements precisely what is needed. A lack of communication between the two elements is evident.

It is clear that better guidance would improve the quality and reduce the volume of reporting; and this smaller volume of better material could in turn be handled more speedily. Formal collection requirements alone cannot do the job: the hungry analyst writes his requirements loosely in order to be sure of getting everything that bears on his subject, and the avid reporter in the field will find *some* bearing on *some* requirement in almost everything. Nor is the present consumer evaluation procedure sufficient to the purpose: in all of FY 1958 CIA, for example, received only 25 spontaneous evaluations of its CS reports, and of those rendered on particular request most were too slow coming—from an average six months up to almost two years in instances—to be useful as a basis for corrective action. What is needed is some new system for rapid and frequent user criticism of individual reports in order to point up good material and weed out at the source any information below the level of significance for the intelligence community.<sup>1</sup>

A third facet of our problem, bearing both on the delay of information and on the analyst's dissatisfaction with what does show up in his in-box, is the practice of successive dissemination through organizational channels, through office or division and branch or section to the individual user. A central mechanized dissemination direct to individuals would save time, but Air Intelligence experiments with such an automatic system<sup>2</sup> indicate that a great deal of excess paper is pumped into the mill by a straight-faced, indiscriminating machine presented with imprecisely defined user requirements. If we can find some way to pinpoint in machine language exactly what each individual analyst requires, we can give him more nearly what he wants and give it to him faster.

<sup>1</sup> For earlier treatments of this problem see William P. Bundy, "The Guiding of Intelligence Collection," *Studies* III 1, p. 37, and Lowell M. Dunleigh, "Spy at Your Service, Sir," *Studies* III 2, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> Described by Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intelligence Information," *Studies* III 1, p. 32. For other aspects of mechanized Air Intelligence information handling see two articles in the series on "Developments in Air Targeting," Outten J. Clinard's "Data Handling Techniques," *Studies* III 2, p. 95, and Kenneth T. Johnson's "Progress and Future Prospects," *Studies* III 3, p. 53.

The problem is then a three-fold one—to speed transmission and processing of reports, to improve by guidance the quality of reporting, and to make dissemination faster and more responsive to precise individual wants. These needs are inter-related in something of a vicious circle: delayed and indiscriminate distribution of reports to users breeds delay in getting evaluations of them back to the originators; user disinterest in outdated information extends to disinterest in commenting on it; lack of evaluative comment means more indiscriminate reporting and dissemination; a greater volume of reports produces still more delay. If we can significantly cut the transmission and processing time and better tailor our dissemination, users will better recognize their own interest in feeding back substantive appreciations to the collector; and the collector will be enabled by prompt user comment to stop wasting his precious manpower on marginal and submarginal operations and spurred to concentrate it on productive enterprises.

#### *Design for Speed*

The design here exhibited of a new system to cope with this triple problem was developed for experimentation on the CS reports of CIA. One of its central features is a roll of perforated paper tape. In its most familiar form it is the tape produced by the perforator unit of a standard M-19 teletype machine, with its rows of up to five holes in different position combinations, each representing a letter or function punched on the keyboard of the machine. When this tape is fed into the M-19 transmitter-distributor each perforation produces an electrical impulse in a channel corresponding to its position, and these impulses are used to key a page printer, or if desired produce an identical tape, at the other end of a telephone line or radio circuit.

A postwar development, the flexowriter, has adapted the tape communicator principle to the electric typewriter with its richer keyboard and smaller print. An increase in the number of impulse channels and corresponding perforation positions on the tape permits enough additional combinations to carry both capital and lower-case letters and some characters and functions, such as semicolons and tabulation, that the teletype machine cannot perform. Experimentally we

can use either the M-19 or a modified flexowriter in our design, but the M-19 is a bit crude for finished reports and the advantages of the flexowriter are largely vitiated by our need to stick to five channels in order to keep the tape compatible with other communications equipment. Both machines are too noisy. New tape-producing typewriters are being developed which will suit us better than either of these.

It is not that we are proposing electric transmission of all routine information reports, not yet at any rate. But we are borrowing many features from cable procedure, and our system will if necessary be immediately convertible, in whole or in part, to one using electric means.

The prepared tape can be automatically scrambled into a quite meaningless pattern of perforations. Thus encrypted, it is secure for radio transmission or, in our design, for air-mailing by whatever means is fastest. In practice, this means will probably be the unaccompanied State Department pouch if arrangements are made to get it on the first available plane without waiting for other material to accumulate: the State pouch cannot be bumped by the air lines and is not held up in customs. The tape should take sometimes as little as one day to reach its consignee, rarely more than three.

In the experimental procedure, then, a routine CS report is typed in the field, beginning with its operational cover sheet, on a tape-producing typewriter. The report will be in the form, a compromise between cable and dispatch format, in which the analyst will in a few days, we hope, find it on his desk; the first manual typing will be the only one in all but exceptional instances. Form headings and other repetitive material need not be so typed even here: a standard tape carrying them can simply be run through. Carbons or a mat in the printer will take care of local dissemination and record copies.

Encrypted and pouched, the tape bypasses in effect all registries in the field and in Washington—a carbon by the usual accompanied pouch will satisfy their needs—and is delivered with only a pause for automatic decryption to the CIA Cable Secretariat. The Secretariat operates day and night with its own courier service and whatever staff is necessary



to get cables to their users within an hour or two of receipt. It has developed exceedingly effective procedures, and this bit of borrowing on our part from cable usage will be important both materially and psychologically. In the Secretariat the unscrambled tape is run through a printer, typing original and carbons of the operational cover sheet, mat and carbons of the report.

Responsibility for releasing the report, however, still rests with the controlling area desk, and that for indicating its dissemination belongs jointly to the desk and to CIA Central Reference. A Central Reference expert will be on duty in the Secretariat, and as soon as the mat is typed he will read it against user requirements and note on its face the proper recipients, as far as possible individual analysts. In the meantime carbons of the report, along with the original and carbons of its cover sheet, have gone to the area desk. If it can be released without further ado, it goes back immediately, assigned a number and showing the addressees prescribed by the desk, to be added to Central Reference's designations. If it requires consultation, comment, or correction, it is held up, possibly a day or so, for these. There will be check-up and inquiry about overdue releases.

Back in the Secretariat, the report number, dissemination instructions, desk comments, and minor corrections can easily be added either on the mat or to the tape, and the tape can either type a new mat or be fed by teletype to the consumer. At some future date the whole community may be sufficiently linked in a secure teletype network that most of the distribution can be accomplished by feeding the corrected tape into it. Considering the usual need for a courier at the receiving end of the teletype line, however, courier service from the Secretariat direct to individuals like that in present use for cables might be at least as fast for many addressees. When there are a large number of recipients at one location, as at the Pentagon, the tape and teletype might be used to print a mat at a central cable center there, say the Army Staff Communications Office, which could then make distribution to Army, ASA, Air Force, Joint Chiefs, and Secretary of Defense offices.

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Field preparation of the tape may have taken a day, transportation as much as three, Secretariat processing possibly another, desk release and distribution perhaps a couple more. When the user analyst gets his information it will probably be no more than a week old. He could get it faster only with a large-scale and costly introduction of new radio and cable circuits with advanced terminal equipment. Field offices and their controlling headquarters desks will find not only their reporting but also their considerably greater volume of operational correspondence all moving at this speed.

*Design for Guidance and Coordination*

This speed alone will help feed back to the source an opinion on the usefulness of his information, but as we have shown, a new medium is needed for communication from user analysts to the originators of reports. We propose a new evaluation procedure, centered on a form bearing a deadline for return. It will call for a quick appraisal by the analyst of the value, credibility, and adequacy of each report in meeting his requirements, with ideas on how it could have been made more useful. We should like eventually also to get here the analyst's comments on its subject-coding, information which should in time build up to yield greater precision in stating requirements, making dissemination, and retrieving documents from storage.

Comments on subject-coding would not be possible under present procedures: information reports as now disseminated have not yet been coded. But in our system the Central Reference expert on duty in the Cable Secretariat who reads a report to determine its proper recipients could also assign it ISC and area codes. If the interposition of this step before dissemination seems an added complication when we are trying to get a report to its users as fast as possible, it would not really take extra time, and the pay-off in getting analysts to think in terms of the codes and in making Central Reference aware of analysts' criteria for coding should be enormous.

The evaluation form will accompany reports sent to those analysts whose feedback is worth exploiting, the specialists concerned with the subject matter reported, those responsible for writing collection requirements on it, those whose work

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will suffer if information is not adequately retrievable because of imprecise coding. It stands to reason that their cooperation will be quickly rewarded by receipt of fewer reports which are of no interest to them, by retrieval of filed materials they need in research, and by the more direct and effective contact with collectors made possible by their responses.

The form will be designed for simple answers and multiple-choice checks both for the convenience of the analyst and to facilitate later processing. In past experience, more than half of the elaborate old evaluation forms are returned with check marks only, no substantive comments whatever. For the most part, therefore, punched-card processing of the new forms will eliminate carbon or reproduced copies and obviate manual sortings and distribution. One operator can punch six to eight hundred forms onto cards in a day. All derived products, except those including lengthy analyst comment, will be tailor-made machine tabulations.

#### *Feedback for Coders*

Every theoretical discussion of retrieval problems brings out the inevitable human limitations in the coding process.<sup>3</sup> Central Reference document analysts are not omniscient universal geniuses; in assigning the apparently pertinent codes they are bound to overlook or not to be aware of angles under which retrieval might in the future become necessary. This is the primary criticism leveled at the present library system by personnel using it. The Intelligence Subject Code, especially with the refinement of its current revision, will be a splendid instrument, useful exactly to the point to which coders properly foresee the headings under which material may need to be recovered, but no further.

The better and more widely known the ISC, the more it is directly used and contributed to by experts in their various fields, the better the retrieval system. If when its revision is complete we could provide a space on the evaluation form for analysts to suggest coding in other categories than those assigned by Central Reference, analysts would become more fa-

<sup>3</sup> See for example George W. Wright, "Toward a Federal Intelligence Memory," *Studies* II 3, p. 7, and Paul A. Borel, "On Processing Intelligence Information," *Studies* III 1, p. 25.

miliar with the coding systems, and any analyst who received a report could take care of his own interests by thus nominating the appropriate codes.

Mechanically, the additional entries could be referred to Central Reference coders in weekly tabulations. These could show report numbers, the additional codes proposed for each, and the names of the contributing analysts. They could be arranged by document or ISC number or in whatever order would be most conducive to integrating them into the system after any necessary discussion with the proponents.

Once this feedback process had been under way for some time and analysts had become used to it, it is hoped they would develop such confidence in the ability of the library—particularly as mechanization provides increasingly reliable and rapid service—to retrieve what they need that they would be willing to dispense with the bulk of their own holdings of indexed documents. Without participation in the coding process we believe this confidence could not be established.

#### *Feedback for Disseminators*

If we are to achieve the speed and efficiency of mechanical dissemination from a central point direct to individual analysts, their individual requirements, as we have noted, will have to be stated with precision and kept up to date by a feedback system suitable for mechanization. Under such a system, dissemination can take place by ISC subject codes, and the assignment of codes to a report would automatically indicate its dissemination. But coded requirements as well as coded reports are a prerequisite for such a mechanized process.

The analyst will be properly skeptical that his subtle needs can ever be fully stated in machine language, and certainly some unusual spot requirements will have to be handled outside any mechanical system. But most requirements can be sufficiently codified to take care of the great routine bulk of dissemination. A codified statement of an analyst's requirements may be derived in the first instance by tabulating his response over a period of some months to key questions on the evaluation form for all the reports he received, along with their assigned subject codes. Document analysts could trans-

late this tabulation into a tentative Statement of Requirements, to be refined in discussion with the analyst concerned. The resultant agreed Statement of Requirements would be used as the basis for current dissemination to him, and it could be kept up to date by the continuing feedback of his evaluations.

This feedback system, properly used, will tend to give the analyst and his supervisor direct control over the volume of information delivered to his in-basket. The supervisor is an interested party because of his responsibility for an equitable distribution of workload to his subordinates, in practice a most difficult task. Most supervisors carry their own workloads and do not inspect their subordinates' in-baskets at regular intervals. Tabulations of the evaluation form by name could provide them every week or at any convenient interval with a list of the reports their subordinates took in and their reactions to them. This tool might be a considerable aid to proper workload distribution.

#### *Feedback for Collectors*

Most of the questions on the form will be designed to guide the collector. Headquarters can use the answers, incorporated into punched card systems covering operational data, sources, project numbers, and lists of requirements, to furnish the field, in tabulations by station or base and source cryptonym, the evaluations placed on all of their reports, matched up against requirements levied on the station. Headquarters desks and staffs will be able, in their planning and control functions, to use not only these but other tabulations, for example listings by project and source of reports and their evaluations, lists by requirement numbers of evaluated reports responsive to requirements, and a variety of statistical compilations. If evaluations run consistently high on a low-cost source, there will be little question about the renewal of his operation. Adverse reactions will provide an indication to the desk and staff that a situation needs to be looked into. User rejections will not be drowned in the stack of paper surfaced once a year in the project renewal process, but will lead to an examination of all pertinent facts and the prompt closing of marginal operations. Desk and staff personnel will be

freed from the routine bookkeeping chores now required to keep track of field reporting.

*From Prototype to Production Model*

This design for speed and guidance has undergone limited tests on the reporting of a major field station, and it has been found to produce at least the short-term benefits anticipated. It is still in the prototype stage, however, subject to modification in more extensive testing planned as equipment becomes available. It may be that new technological developments, for example photographic or magnetic tape encryption processes now being investigated, will make major changes desirable. In any case it will require adaptation to varying local needs in the field before it can be generally applied to the reporting of even this Agency.

There will be many obstacles to the integration of the reporting of the whole community in a single system. They will have to be tackled slowly, and piecemeal. The easiest beginning will probably be on the receiving end, with the extension of rapid dissemination and the application of some better evaluation system in those agencies, notably Air Intelligence, that employ the Intelligence Subject Code. Efforts are now under way to standardize the format of all community reporting. For all its tentative and limited nature, our design does provide a basic concept and may embody some specific features that can lead to an ultimate integrated reporting system.

*Significant advance and recalcitrant bugs in the procedure for urgent intelligence flashes.*

## NOTES ON THE CRITIC SYSTEM

William A. Tidwell

*"A true critick ought to . . . communicate to the world such things as are worth their observation."*

Joseph Addison's job description in 1712 could also be the motto for a special CRITIC set up by the intelligence community in mid-1958, the reporting system responsive to a directive that critical intelligence be communicated from the field to the "highest authorities" in "speeds approaching ten minutes." CRITIC does communicate rapidly to this high executive world things that are worthy of their urgent attention, specifically indications of international crisis or impending military hostilities. If, in its present state of development and with the communications hardware now in use, there are relatively few occasions on which a CRITIC message actually moves from reporter to intelligence user in ten minutes' time, the establishment of the system has nevertheless made radical changes in the flow of critical intelligence to Washington, and messages handled under it take only a fraction of the average time required for similar messages before its inauguration.

### *Establishment and Performance*

The intelligence community has always been concerned with the rapid reporting of urgent items, but a systematic community-wide assault on the problem did not get under way until the autumn of 1957. At that time a study of the reporting related to the Turkish-Syrian crisis and certain selected indicators of Soviet military activity demonstrated that many critically important items were being handled in a routine manner and that they frequently required more than 24 hours to reach the White House. In terms of averages, a message containing information such as is now handled in the CRITIC system would take nine hours and a half

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to move from the field reporter to the intelligence user in Washington.

The results of this study were given to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which, with the concurrence of the IAC, recommended to the President that the problem be attacked with the utmost vigor by the intelligence community. This recommendation was approved by the President, and the community initiated action on two fronts, that of facilities and that of procedures. The first resulted in the promulgation of NSCID No. 7, designating the Department of Defense as executive agent for creating and managing a world-wide communications system for the transmission of critical intelligence. The second led to the establishment of the CRITIC system of procedures for rapid reporting over this world-wide communications net.

From the beginning it was obvious that the initial decision as to whether an item of information is of critical nature would have to be made by the field reporters. At the same time it was clear that field reporting personnel, not always apprised of all the related information available in Washington, might err in their judgments. It was necessary, therefore, while giving as much guidance as possible to the field, to reserve to intelligence headquarters in Washington the opportunity for final evaluation of CRITIC items before passing them to the White House.

Critical intelligence was therefore defined as "information indicating a situation or pertaining to a situation which affects the security or interests of the United States to such an extent that it *may* require the immediate attention of the President," and in DCID No. 1/8 specific categories of information considered to fall under this definition were listed. Field reporting personnel of all intelligence agencies were directed to prefix the indicator CRITIC to all messages containing information under these headings and to forward them under high precedence by the most rapid communications means available. It was arranged that in Washington messages carrying this indicator would receive simultaneous electrical dissemination to all the main USIB agencies and to the Strategic and the Tactical Air Commands. The system was put into effect on 21 July 1958.



Like most new undertakings, the CRITIC system operated with a certain amount of creaking and groaning during the first few months, but its effect on the speed of reporting was immediately apparent. CRITIC messages already moved from field reporters to intelligence users in Washington in an average of about an hour and a half, as against the 9½-hour average during the Turkish-Syrian crisis. The Critical Communications Committee, monitoring the system on behalf of the USIB, spent a great deal of time refining the interpretation of various categories in the CRITIC list and unsnarling procedural problems as they were identified. By the end of the first year of operations the average transmission times had dropped to an hour or less, an accomplishment made possible by improvements in the hardware and operating procedures of the supporting communications services along with better handling of the traffic in the intelligence agencies.

#### *Persistent Problems*

The progress achieved by the CRITIC system has thus been excellent, but a number of problems remain to be overcome before it can reach full efficiency. For one thing, it can function perfectly only if the messages are kept short, but field reporting personnel have not all learned yet to be as concise as possible. It is still not unusual for a message to contain hundreds of groups, and one even reached the 3,000 mark. It is obvious that these messages cannot be put through in ten-minute service by present communications equipment, operating at 60 or 100 words per minute. Long messages to describe a complex situation could often be obviated by a series of short messages sent as the situation develops.

Some headquarters personnel have been misled by the definition of critical intelligence as matter for "the immediate attention of the President" into thinking that each CRITIC message should in itself be something of an earth-shaker. But there are a number of categories of CRITIC items, indicators of Soviet hostile intent, which become critical only as they form a critical pattern. The pattern, however, can be discerned only in Washington, by the combination of its several elements; and field reporters without access to the rest of the pattern must therefore give CRITIC handling to in-

dividual elements, items which may prove in Washington to be isolated events of relatively little significance.

Some reporting personnel have not understood that the handling of CRITIC messages in Washington is organized on a community-wide basis, that the CRITIC designator is less a communications precedence indicator than an addressee group which automatically ensures immediate distribution by electrical means to all appropriate addressees in the Washington area. Their consequent designation of multiple addressees has increased handling and processing time and delayed delivery to intended recipients. One reporter even addressed a CRITIC message to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, causing General Twining to be awakened in the middle of the night and blocking delivery of the message to its proper recipients until he could authorize its release.

Such shortcomings as these, however, are probably inevitable when a large number of widely dispersed people are called upon to learn a new system of operation; experience and further training of both intelligence and communications personnel should greatly improve performance in these respects. More recalcitrant is a problem arising from a communications fact of life: in a number of highly important countries of the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, the U.S. Government cannot maintain its own communications facilities and is dependent upon commercial facilities or the monopolies of the governments concerned, which of course do not recognize the comparative precedence assigned a message within the U.S. Government systems. Some of these governments might be willing on a reciprocal basis to grant us the right to operate our own communications, but the granting of such rights in the United States is contrary to U.S. policy. Communications from these forbidden areas are generally the responsibility of CIA and the Department of State. Both organizations are hard at work on the problem, and there is some hope that improvements can be effected.

In the communications systems operated by the U.S. Government, considerable additional improvements are planned or under way. We have good reason to believe that CRITIC messages handled by these facilities can achieve average

speeds of 10 minutes or less within the very near future. Numerous test messages transmitted in substantially less than ten minutes prove that the goal of "speeds approaching ten minutes" is attainable under the right conditions. The CRITIC system will become a "true critick," however, only by virtue of alert and efficient support from a great number of intelligence and communications personnel in many agencies of the Government. Great strides have been made, but there is still work to do.

*A critical review of prewar Japanese military intelligence operations in Manchuria.*

## ANTI-SOVIET OPERATIONS OF KWANTUNG ARMY INTELLIGENCE, 1931-39<sup>1</sup>

Richard G. Brown

Japanese military intelligence operations against the Soviet Union in the Far East became of prime importance after Japan took over Manchuria in 1932. Before that she had no great need for intelligence on the Soviet forces in the Far East, inasmuch as she had no common international boundary with the U.S.S.R. on the continent, the Chinese being in control of most of Manchuria. At the time of the Manchurian incident the Japanese nevertheless had potentially strong operational intelligence assets in numerous inhabitants of the Korean and Chinese border areas who were able to cross into Soviet territory with relative ease so long as Soviet security remained generally lax. In addition, there were numerous anti-Communist White Russians in northern Manchuria willing and able to engage in intelligence activities for the Japanese.

The intelligence operations of the principal Japanese agency in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, included propaganda, sabotage, counterintelligence, and what was to become a major collection effort on the Soviet army and the geography of the area. The means it employed included the dispatch of secret agents into Soviet territory, the interception of radio communications, the interrogation of Soviet deserters and defectors, and the establishment of border observation units.

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on historical data compiled, with the assistance of personnel of the Japanese Kwantung Army, by the Military History Section of Headquarters, Army Forces Far East, and distributed by the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. The principal source is Volume X of the Series *Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria*, issued in June 1955 under the title "Japanese Intelligence Planning Against the USSR."

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From the first the Kwantung Army and the Army General Staff in Tokyo were alert for indications of Soviet reaction to the Manchurian incident, and after Kwantung Army elements moved into the Soviet sphere of influence the surveillance of Soviet actions in the Far East, particularly any military movements, was intensified. Yet Japanese military headquarters felt that the Soviet Union had no intention of intervening in the situation, and so devoted its attention not to immediate countermeasures but to consolidating the Japanese position in Manchuria and developing an extensive intelligence network as Kwantung Army units advanced toward the Soviet border. This intelligence effort was intensified as Soviet border defenses improved: aerial photography during the summer of 1933 revealed extensive fortifications designed to check Japanese military operations against Soviet territory.

#### *Agent Infiltration*

The principal field intelligence units under the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army staff were eight Army Special Services Agencies. Of these it was the unit in Harbin which played the major role in the Manchurian operations. The Harbin ASSA used White Russians for espionage missions, and these were the best of the agents available. The border area ASSA's occasionally used White Russians, but relied mainly on local Chinese and Koreans. These agents were infiltrated into Soviet territory to carry out espionage. Occasional deserters from the Soviet army were also exploited for information.


The Soviets commenced to bolster border security during 1935. They increased the number of border garrison units, ordered the evacuation of border area inhabitants, and instituted constant patrolling. A Soviet counterespionage network in Manchurian territory, especially in the border area, regularly observed and reported on the movements of Japanese agents. The White Russians, while more reliable and competent than other agents, being most of them ardent anti-Communists, were more easily detected. Many were shot in attempting to cross the border, and the majority did not return, thanks to effective Soviet security. A deadlock in trans-border operations resulted.

The standstill in intelligence operations was quite embarrassing to the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence Section, which therefore came increasingly to take over the active direction of the intelligence services in Manchuria, particularly of the ASSA units. Efforts were made to improve techniques of agent infiltration, to take more pains in forging credentials, to pay more attention to dress, baggage, and language, to give better training for missions and reporting. Attention was also given to other means of intelligence collection—communications, publications, and telescopic observation.

#### *Communications Intercepts*

Soviet communications in the Far East relied mainly on wireless; the wire network had failed to keep pace with the mushrooming military and industrial expansion. A very considerable number of Soviet message circuits were thus vulnerable to interception. In order to learn the techniques for breaking codes, the General Staff in Tokyo had sent several technical officers to Poland in 1933 and 1934: the Polish Army General Staff's cryptanalytic work was considered by the Japanese to be among the best in the world. When the first contingent of these officers returned from Poland in 1935, a small unit for studies on radio interception and the breaking of Soviet codes was formed and assigned to the Kwantung Army. Eventually this unit was expanded and became known as the Communication Intelligence Group, operating directly under the supervision of the Kwantung Army intelligence service.

The interception and analysis of Soviet plain-text messages was not undertaken until 1936, when the Soviet Union began to construct the Baikal-Amur Magistral to supplement the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The BAM line was a matter of grave concern to the Japanese General Staff, but the Kwantung Army Intelligence Section had no means of observing the progress of construction on it. The Operations Section therefore took the initiative and asked the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway Company to establish a branch of its Communications Research Department in Harbin. This branch was charged with intercepting plain-text wireless messages concerning construction on the BAM line and with



analysis of the intercepted data with respect to selected subjects. Although this installation supplied data to the intelligence network through the very active Harbin ASSA, the fact that it was conceived and supervised by the Operations Section became an irritant in this Section's relations with the Intelligence Section. The success of the Railway Company's unit led the intelligence service to supplement its code interceptions with clear text intercepts, which were thereafter forwarded on ticker tape to the Harbin ASSA for analysis by its Document Intelligence Division.

#### *Document Analysis*

The importance of available Soviet publications, primarily newspapers published in the Far East, had somewhat belatedly become apparent to the Japanese, and the few publication analysts originally assigned to the Harbin ASSA had been augmented and formed into the Document Intelligence Division. Its staff included a large number of White Russian intellectuals, as well as Japanese competent to interpret and analyze Soviet documents, publications and messages. Periodicals, handbills, newspapers, magazines, books, booklets, pamphlets, and even personal notebooks collected by the various intelligence agencies were sent to the Harbin ASSA for scrutiny. Later, when it became difficult to obtain documents, greater importance was attached to Soviet radio broadcasts, along with the intercepted clear-text wireless messages. But there were still documents obtained by agents, papers carried by the occasional defectors from Soviet territory, and in one instance a windfall of postal communications from a Soviet mail plane which made a forced landing in Manchuria in 1938.

#### *Border Observation*

In the early thirties the military units of the Kwantung Army manned posts for visual observation of Soviet territory; each front-line unit had a few lookout posts equipped with 24-power battery telescopes. After the difficulties in intelligence collection became acute in 1934, the intelligence service undertook to improve and expand this system as an intelligence activity. The observation posts were organized as "Soviet Territory Observation Teams" who were to keep the Soviet side of the border under surveillance day and night,



recording in detail the movement of even a single soldier, horse, or vehicle. The posts were each manned by approximately one squad. They used telescopes of various types, ranging up to one of 150 power obtained from the Navy for night use. The front-line Army commands were ordered to make use of any suitable points in their respective sectors for this purpose, and to train and supervise the personnel to make the observations. Nevertheless, up until 1938 these teams were often composed of inferior personnel and occasionally even lacked telescopes. Some of their more important reports were on the arrival and departure of ships in Vladivostok harbor, as observed from posts at Wangchaoshan and Tumentzu, and on the arrival and departure of aircraft at Voroshilov, as seen by posts at Suifenho and Tungning.

#### *Achievements and Failures*

By mid-1939 the Kwantung Army's intelligence agencies had scored considerable progress in improving their operations. In 1935 the communications intelligence Research Unit had succeeded in breaking the simple codes used by the Soviet border forces, and constant study brought later successes against Soviet army codes of three and four letters. Although these codes were not commonly used for important messages, the Research Unit was nevertheless able to learn the organization and disposition of some border garrisons and the location and movements of some air units. It also did traffic analysis, compiling statistics on the origin and volume of Soviet radio messages.

The interception and study of plain-text messages by the South Manchurian Railway's Communications Research Department yielded considerable information about the progress of construction on the BAM line. The Kwantung Army's Research Unit was also able to obtain from plain-text intercepts some valuable indications about particular military situations in Asiatic Russia. Analyzing this data, the Document Intelligence Branch of Kwantung Army intelligence was able to reach conclusions about the disposition of units, changes in units, their commanders, their numerical designations, the arrival of new personnel, and their places of origin, as indicated by messages of safe arrival sent home. Messages in the

clear also supplied many fragmentary details about industrial and economic conditions in Asiatic Russia, and these often contributed to important findings.

The piecemeal data compiled by the Harbin Document Intelligence Division was on many occasions helpful to higher echelons in making estimates of the enemy's strength and disposition. A compilation of file cards on approximately 4,000 Soviet officers in the Far East, for example, contributed significantly to ascertaining the order of battle for Soviet army forces in eastern Asia. An unusual operation undertaken by the Division was the examination of postal matter in the Soviet mail plane which made a forced landing in Manchuria in 1938. The mail had to be secretly opened, sorted, copied, and resealed while diplomatic negotiations for the return of the airplane and its crew were being carried on. The analysis of the material was completed within a month.

The observation teams engaged in telescopic surveillance of Soviet territory produced some information but on the whole were not notably successful. They provided details on Soviet fortification improvements in parts of the border zone and on new military roads, barracks, and warehouses behind the fortifications, and they compiled statistical data on vehicle operations supporting the fortified zone. Efforts of the ASSA's to penetrate Soviet territory with spies were nearly all failures, but their interrogation of fugitives from Soviet territory often uncovered important information.

A test of the Kwantung Army's intelligence services was afforded in 1939 by the development of the Nomonhan incident, which began in May as a series of clashes between Soviet and Japanese forces guarding the border between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. By June it had become a major engagement of divisional magnitude and in August a failure for the Japanese. This operation disclosed several serious defects of organization and technique in Kwantung Army intelligence, in spite of its significant improvement since 1931. In general, it showed itself still not sufficiently modernized and systematized to be effective. It also showed marked differences of system and procedure among its several components.

*Deficiencies at Nomonhan*

The chief defects of the Kwantung Army's headquarters Intelligence Section arose from its having assumed over a period of years complete control of all the ASSA's. Its own functioning had consequently become extremely complex and its real aims were often lost from sight. Properly a policy planning staff, the Section had been transformed into an operating agency, and the detail arising from its domination of the ASSA's constantly obstructed it. As the discharge of its normal responsibilities became careless under these stresses, the headquarters Operations Section lost confidence in it and tended to make its own estimates, arbitrary and independent, drawn from scanty information and often from untested sources. The Intelligence Section was unable to halt this trend, and it became more pronounced with the passage of time.

This headquarters involvement with the ASSA's was aggravated by an organizational weakness in the coordination of these units which prevented them from being utilized systematically. The ASSA's had failed to systematize liaison and cooperation among themselves. The Harbin ASSA, which had the greatest experience and capacity in Soviet intelligence and a staff more comprehensive and diversified than any of the others, was kept on an equal footing with the other seven, so that the benefit of its knowledge and expert guidance was not imparted to them. With all eight operating independently under the direct control of the Intelligence Section, the administrative burden became too great during the Nomonhan incident.

A serious procedural defect in the handling of information was illustrated by an incident which produced a minor crisis in relations between the Intelligence and Operations Sections. The Harbin ASSA had obtained through a contact in the office of the Soviet consul general there a file purporting to be extracts from message traffic between Moscow and Khabarovsk. Initially this correspondence seemed authentic and important, but developments after the outbreak of the Nomonhan incident convinced the Intelligence Section that it was false and deceptive. The Operations Section, however, which had obtained a copy of it from the Harbin ASSA,

assumed that it had been acquired by interception and decipherment, and reproduced it under highest security classification. The Intelligence Section failed to report the deceptive nature of this correspondence to the Operations Section, which therefore tended to be misled by it in some phases of the Nomonhan operations.

It was not until the last stages of this engagement, as the Kwantung Army was concentrating its strength for an attack, that the communications intelligence Research Unit achieved some moderate success in learning the disposition of Soviet and Mongolian troops in the Far East; and even this limited accomplishment was made from the vantage point of Changchun—almost 500 miles from the scene of battle. The Kwantung Army's inadequacies in the communications intelligence field were strikingly apparent in its failure to have a signal detail in the front-line areas for the collection of battlefield information transmitted by wireless in either code or plain text, for the Soviet army often transmitted in clear text in situations demanding speed, and the increase in the number of coded communications for combat purposes would have facilitated the solution of the Soviet code. Communications facilities in the vastness of Outer Mongolia, the locale of this conflict, were so patently poor that a significant increase in radio traffic was to have been expected at the outbreak of hostilities. Japanese interception equipment was not developed sufficiently, however, nor were operators adequately trained to tap this source of intelligence. Another communications deficiency was the lack of a network for the exclusive use of the intelligence services; the secret missions that did get into Soviet territory were often therefore isolated.

A committee of officers from Kwantung Army headquarters and the General Staff in Tokyo later reviewed the Kwantung Army's performance during the Nomonhan incident and found a number of weaknesses. Chief among these was the fact that the operations staff officer had insufficient confidence in the estimates of the enemy situation made by the intelligence staff officer, and as result was inclined to form his own estimates on an inadequate intelligence foundation, sometimes even basing his decisions exclusively on the peace-

time situation. Another was the preoccupation of intelligence officers with peacetime intelligence problems to such an extent that they failed to develop a war mobilization plan and thus were unable to exploit enemy activity during the No-monhan hostilities. A third was the fact that improvements in techniques were insufficiently taken advantage of, and that there was a great need for systematizing operations and procedures. The committee recommended that major improvements be made in the peacetime operation of the intelligence services and in preparing them for wartime activity, so that intelligence estimates, as well as other intelligence products, would enjoy the full confidence of operations officers and be accorded full weight.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*How FCC's routine policing of the ether became in World War II a multi-purpose defense service and a far-flung counter-espionage operation.*

## THE U.S. HUNT FOR AXIS AGENT RADIOS

George E. Sterling

I hope that this country, particularly its intelligence agencies, has become better organized to handle a national emergency than it was in 1941. When the war, after slowly creeping for two years from Europe toward U.S. shores, suddenly exploded upon us at Pearl Harbor, thousands of new kinds of things had to be undertaken in desperate haste and with at times disorderly improvisation. Many agencies were given emergency duties for no better reason than that they were using equipment approximating what was needed for the war-time work. That they by and large discharged these extraordinary responsibilities well, at the same time helping cooperatively toward the gradual readjustment of temporarily assigned functions, is something in which all those who participated can take pride.

The Federal Communications Commission, because it had a network of radio monitoring and direction-finding stations to police the domestic airwaves, was given its full share of duties not called for in its job description. It ran a rescue service for planes lost in the black-out or bad weather, locating them by their radio signals and furnishing them their bearings; more than 600 planes, many of which would otherwise have been really lost, were given FCC emergency fixes before Army Air Force personnel were trained, with our help, to take over the job. It monitored enemy commercial radio circuits and furnished the Board of Economic Warfare with hundreds of leads useful in the preclusive buying program. To meet requirements of the Eastern, Gulf, and Western defense commands, the Commission's legal responsibility for apprehending unlicensed radio stations was extended to surveillance of the coast by radio patrols for signs of surrepti-

tious communication with enemy submarines. The network intercepted foreign weather traffic for our air forces. It monitored foreign radio broadcasts, setting up the organization which now has become the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and published texts and analyses of broadcast news and propaganda for a variety of government consumers. It trained OSS personnel in radio methods and procedures and built equipment for their use.

For a year and a quarter the FCC's Radio Intelligence Division, as the monitoring network was known, carried the full load of military radio intelligence in Alaska, where the Army was not able to station a radio intelligence company until late in 1942 and got a monitoring station in operation only in the spring of 1943. It radio-patrolled the Alaskan coast by sea. It also participated at Army request in military intelligence elsewhere, most notably in Hawaii and on the west coast. In San Francisco it set up an Intelligence Center where officers of the military services were on duty around the clock. It identified and tracked the radio-equipped balloons which the Japanese launched against our west coast. It discovered and established the location of a Nazi weather station on Greenland, which the Coast Guard was then able to destroy. It trained the military personnel who eventually took over most of these duties, prepared instructional booklets and monitoring aids for them, and supervised their work until they became competent enough to operate without help.

The RID even participated from afar in the guerrilla movements in the Philippines. This activity began when one of our monitors picked up a signal using the call, PK1JC, of an amateur in the Dutch East Indies, where no amateurs could operate. We fixed its origin in northern Luzon. PK1JC sent a message coded, we determined, with a prewar Signal Corps cipher disk, giving the name and serial number of an surrendered American soldier trying to establish contact with MacArthur's headquarters. He requested acknowledgement by a signal from General Electric's powerful KGEI transmitter near San Francisco. The Signal Corps arranged for this acknowledgement and asked us to continue copying all his messages. Later, when the landing of transmitters by submarine created quite heavy traffic from the Philippine guer-

rillas, a primary monitoring station at San Leandro, California, was exclusively devoted, at Signal Corps request, to copying it and expediting it by private teletype circuit to Washington.

*Policing the Domestic Ether*

Although these spirited improvisations requested and supported by the military services lay far outside the Commission's proper charter, the Communications Act of 1934, they were undertaken eagerly when required and relinquished later gracefully but with reluctance by our radio men and women anxious to contribute to the war effort in any way they could. Our people had enough of their own proper work to do, for after Pearl Harbor the regular job of the Radio Intelligence Division took on a new and grimmer aspect. It was now not just a question of tracking down maladjusted transmitters, unshielded diathermy apparatus, or even the illegal communications of pranksters, smugglers, and racetrack tipsters, but of sealing the country's leaky ether against loss of war secrets over the radio circuits of enemy agents. Hitherto, with commercial communications to foreign countries free of surveillance, spies in this country had had no need to risk secret transmitters; now these commercial facilities were closed or censored and the whole spectrum had to be patrolled for furtive whisperings in Morse cipher. The RID was under challenge to live up to its initials.

The Division's equipment, personnel, and physical deployment were adequate to the task. During the state of national emergency that preceded Pearl Harbor the FCC had been authorized to begin an expansion of its radio detection facilities, which were ultimately stabilized in twelve primary monitoring stations, about sixty subordinate monitoring posts, and about ninety mobile units distributed through the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Alaska. The fixed stations and many of the mobile units were linked by instantaneous communications. They were organized into three major networks based on radio intelligence centers respectively in Washington, near San Francisco, and in Honolulu; but in fixing the location of a source of radio signals the three networks were fused into one and directed from Washington.



Each primary station, in addition to its complex of rhombic and other antennae and its receiving and recording equipment, had at least one Adcock direction finder, a large rotating antenna sensitive to the direction of shortwave signals bounced off the ionosphere; this device had been invented in England, but was refined and improved by RID engineers. At short range, say within a few miles, a simple loop antenna can pick up the ground-wave component of a signal and determine its direction; our disguised mobile units included these in their equipment. And finally, for locating transmitters at really close quarters, we developed what we called a "snifter," a signal-strength meter that a man could carry in the palm of his hand while inspecting a building to determine which room a signal came from.

In the routine day-and-night operation of a monitoring station, the patrolman of the ether would cruise his beat, passing up and down the frequencies of the usable radio spectrum, noting the landmarks of the regular fixed transmissions, recognizing the peculiar modulation of a known transmitter or the characteristic fist of a familiar operator, observing an irregularity in operating procedure and pausing long enough to verify the call letters, or finding a strange signal and recording the traffic for close examination, and then sometimes alerting the nation-wide net to obtain a fix on the location of its source. More than 800 such fixes would be made in an average month, requiring the taking of some 6,000 individual bearings. For although mathematically the intersection of two bearings provides a fix, the 1% error that must in practice be allowed in the angle of a bearing, even when it is corrected for variations in propagation and site conditions, becomes considerable at distances that may run to thousands of miles; and at least four bearings are needed for a reasonably reliable long-range fix.

#### *Radio Spies in the United States*

With respect to Axis agents in the United States and its territories this close vigilance was almost purely prophylactic, and effective in its prophylaxis: out of respect for its enemy agents, as far as we ourselves were able to discover, made only two attempts during the entire war to establish radio communications across our ethereal frontiers, and in both cases

failed to get a single message through.<sup>1</sup> The stories of these two, although they have been told from other viewpoints elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> are worth summarizing here.



The first took place in the spring of 1940, long before Pearl Harbor had roused us to hunt for radio spies here in earnest. Our routine monitoring turned up an unidentified transmitter carrying on coded traffic with a distant station which used the call AOR. We asked the Army and the Navy if it might be one of theirs. They had no knowledge of it; the Navy thought it might be a St. John, New Brunswick, station. But our direction finders showed it to be on Long Island, and its correspondent AOR near Hamburg, Germany. We reported to the FBI.

The Bureau told us in confidence that it was indeed a German agent radio, but under their control. A German-American, William Sebold, had revealed that he was recruited by the Nazis and instructed to set it up. The FBI built and now were manning the station for him, feeding Hamburg false or innocuous information and identifying its agent sources. The deception continued for more than a year under our joint surveillance, until at the end of June, 1941, 33 German agents to whom the traffic had furnished leads were arrested. At their trial that fall, when the defense tried to maintain that AOR was not a German station but an FBI entrapment device in the United States, RID engineer Albert McIntosh produced charts showing the fix on Hamburg. His public testimony must have been one factor in the German decision not to risk agent transmitters in the United States.

They did try it once more, though, right after Pearl Harbor, apparently on local initiative, impromptu. In the general alert which followed that shocking Sunday morning we had put several mobile monitoring units out cruising the Washington streets. These were equipped not only with loop direction finders but with a device we called the watch-dog, an

<sup>1</sup> Wilhelm Hoettl, one of the German foreign intelligence area chiefs, affirmed during his interrogation by 3rd Army in June 1945 that the Sicherheitsdienst had not been able to establish a single wireless connection either in the United States or in England.

<sup>2</sup> Notably in Don Whitehead's *The FBI Story*.



FIGURES 1 AND 2

aperiodic receiver we had developed which would sound an alarm when it received a strong signal on any of a wide range of frequencies. (It was patented by two RID engineers and later used by OSS and the Navy.) In the wee hours of Tuesday, December 9, one of these watch-dogs was triggered by signals on a transatlantic frequency. At the same moment three thousand miles away our monitors in Portland, Oregon, heard them too—station UA briefly and vainly calling a distant control center. Five other direction-finding stations were set to watch the frequency; and when a few hours later UA tried it again, they reported the bearings projected on the chart in Figure 1. This fix confirmed the uncertain supposition of the watch-dog that the transmitter was in Washington.

Now three mobile units were given the scent, and they quickly narrowed down the location to the German Embassy, as shown in Figure 2. It was a problem to pin-point the transmitter without entering the Embassy because the antenna was stretched between two buildings, with equal signal strength at each end and apparently lead-in wires to both buildings. This problem was solved in a pre-dawn conference with the FBI, who arranged, in cooperation with the Potomac Electric Power Co., that we could go down into a manhole in the street and cut the power to each building separately in turn when UA began to call. In the end, however, because the State Department was afraid for our own diplomatic mission still in Germany, we did not seize UA but simply set up two jammers to drown him out if he should try once more. He never did.

This beginning was the end for Axis radio agents within our borders; any German agents picked up by the FBI thereafter were found to have been using secret ink or some other communications than radio to get information out of the country. And we learned that some Japanese agents who requested their headquarters' permission to set up a transmitter here were turned down on the grounds that the FCC would nab them as soon as they got on the air. Outside our own states and territories it was a different story, one in which also the RID became intimately concerned.

*The Portuguese Net*

One day in September 1941, monitors at the secondary RID post in Miami heard a station using irregular procedures and signing the call UU2, one not in conformity with those used on commercial and other authorized circuits. It was therefore made a case for investigation. Bearings fixed its location near Lisbon, Portugal; and as it continued to call almost nightly without receiving a reply, RID units were instructed to be on the lookout for the answering station. After more than a month monitors at the secondary posts in Pittsburg and Albuquerque simultaneously picked up the answer from a station signing CNA; bearings were taken which located this transmitter in South Africa.

A few days later another station using the UU2 procedure was intercepted, this time with the call BX7. It was also in Lisbon, and the characteristics of its signal showed that without question BX7 was the same station which had previously signed UU2, apparently the control station of a network. After a week an answer with the call letters NPD was picked up by our Rhode Island monitoring post. This station proved to be in Portuguese West Africa.

The messages exchanged between the Lisbon control UU2/BX7 and the two out-stations in Africa were of course enciphered. RID did not maintain a cryptanalysis laboratory, decipherment being the responsibility of the FBI, of the Army's Signal Intelligence Service, and, on behalf of the Navy, of the Coast Guard; but in order to facilitate the identification of intercepted traffic we had interested a couple of our staff in cryptanalytic work. These men attained a considerable skill and in some cases were able to furnish leads for the FBI decipherment. The Lisbon cipher was one of these cases. It was an up-and-down transposition whose key length varied from day to day.

The texts of the messages showed this network to be one channel by which German agents in the neutral countries and colonies of Africa reported on the movements of ships, troops, and materiel and on political events. On March 26, 1942, for example, the South Africa station reported ship sail-

ings and the concentration of Allied troops which later took Madagascar. As translated from the Portuguese:

TWENTYSIXTH. AMERICANS "NISHNAHA" AND "SOLONTU-SHAW" SAILED WITH ORE FOR NEW ORLEANS, ALSO ENGLISH "CITY OF N. CASTLE"; "ANGOLA" AND ENGLISH "ISIPIEGO" FROM DURBAN ARRIVED WITH PASSENGERS. TROOPS STILL CONCENTRATED; TRYING TO LEARN DETAILS.

From Portuguese West Africa an agent with the code-name Armando sent similar information intermingled freely with operational reports. On December 4, 1941:

ARMANDO REPORTS ENGLISH CONSUL RECEIVED LONG EN-CIPHERED TELEGRAM RELATIVE ENFORCING STRICT VIGILANCE AGAINST ESPIONAGE. OFFICIALS CLAIMED ENGLISH STILL COMMAND CAPE VERDE SUBMARINE CABLE. MANY MEN GO TO FREETOWN OWING APPROACH TEN CONVOY SHIPS, LARGE TROOPS, AMMUNITION AND TANKS. HOWEVER INFORMER DOES NOT KNOW IF THEY REMAIN LAGOS OR FREETOWN AND BATHURST.

On January 7, 1942:

WEST INDIA ARRIVED BATHURST FOURTEEN WITH PILOTS AIRCRAFT MECHANICS DISASSEMBLED TANKS ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS MUNITIONS LARGE QUANTITY GASOLINE CAMPAIGN TENTS. NEXT MONTH WE WILL HAVE REGULAR CONNECTION DAKAR THROUGH INTELLIGENT NATIVE GOLD-SMITH AUTHORIZED TO ENTER COLONIAL SERVICE UNDER GOVERNOR TO HELP MY WORK. ARMANDO

On February 5:

CHIEF OF POLICE LIEUTENANT UNDERCOVER IMPRUDENTLY WORKS FOR ENGLISH. CONVENIENT TO OBTAIN HIS RETURN LISBON. HE CAN DAMAGE US. ARMANDO

But the Germans were growing dissatisfied with Armando's work. The Lisbon station radioed him on February 11:

SAID THERE IS TO BE DISEMBARKMENT ENGLISH AMERICAN TROOPS DAKAR NEXT FIFTEEN DAYS. WHY NO REPORTS MOST URGENT.

On February 12:

DISEMBARKATION TROOPS FREETOWN NOT DAKAR. I ORDER YOU INVESTIGATE. NOT SATISFIED REPORTS WHICH I CALL FOR. HAVE RECEIVED BETTER REPORTS FROM OTHER PERSONS.

And most indiscreetly, on 27 March:

SECURE EXPEDITIOUSLY RECENT REPORTS DAKAR FREE-TOWN RELIEVE CAROLINA OF HIS DUTIES. USE NEW INK. BEARER SHOULD DELIVER LETTERS PERSONALLY TO PORTER HOTEL DUAS HACOES VICTORIA STREET FOR MR. MERCKEL. WE ARE EXPERIMENTING CONTINUATION ORGANIZATION TWO MORE MONTHS. USE YOUR BEST REPORTS FOR MY VINDICATION.

The organization did not in fact last much longer than two more months, but it was not the Germans who terminated it. Revelations like this one enabled Allied intelligence officers to clean out the Portuguese group in the summer of 1942.

*Nazi Agent Training and Procedures*

Having thus demonstrated its capability in the European theater, the RID was approached early in 1942 by its British counterpart, the Radio Security Service, with a request for the establishment of regular liaison and exchange of information. From then on to the end of the war we maintained a most harmonious and fruitful relationship which served to build up a pretty complete picture of the German diplomatic and espionage networks and their activities. The characteristics of individual transmitters and individual operators were recorded and catalogued so that they could be recognized when they were used on a different circuit. Nearly all the codes and ciphers were broken, and the great bulk of the clandestine traffic could be promptly read. During the most critical period of the war in Europe the RID was monitoring 222 frequencies used in clandestine intra-European circuits.

After the Lisbon net was closed down the Germans had five major networks, with control centers in Berlin, Hamburg, Bordeaux, Madrid, and Paris. The out-stations were located in practically every European country, in Africa and the Atlantic, and in the western hemisphere. The operators of these out-stations were in general not skilled radiomen, we learned from captured spies, but agents who had been trained in radio and codes and ciphers along with other tradecraft—for example photography and microfilm, secret writing, explosives and demolition—at a school near Hamburg. Their radio

training embraced the use of International Morse and the construction and operation of transmitters and receivers.

Student operators were required to achieve the modest transmitting speed of twelve words a minute (as compared, for example, with our Merchant Marine requirement of 20-25 words a minute). Then they would make a five-minute sample transmission on a device which recorded graphically their speed, touch, and characteristic fist. On the basis of this graph they were assigned a permanent transmitting speed and given another week's training at this speed. Then a second graph was made as each operator graduated, this one to be filed as a specimen signature against which his later messages would be verified as genuine and not the deception of enemy counterespionage. This procedure was apparently adopted after the Germans learned that the FBI had fooled them with the Sebold station on Long Island.

The agents were furnished portable transmitters and receivers, usually of the type built into a suitcase, complete with antenna wire, tools, and all the accessories necessary for going into immediate operation. They were given precise instructions for constructing a directional antenna which would afford a maximum signal to their control center and a minimum to eavesdroppers. Then they were dispatched to their posts by neutral ship, by submarine, by parachute, or over clandestine land routes.

The first sign of their safe arrival would be their call letters on the air; and this would signify their presence to us, too, for it is difficult to disguise an agent radio's call. At one time, when the control of one of the German nets passed from the Abwehr to the Gestapo, its transmitters adopted the call letters and frequencies of commercial stations in South America; but other characteristic procedures of clandestine traffic still betrayed them, and this device was later abandoned.

Not being able to disguise their calls, the agent networks made a practice of changing call letters, usually every day, in an effort to spoil continuity for their pursuers. But very few had a rota which remained nonrepetitive for a year, say, and we were able to work out in advance the call letters which many espionage transmitters would be using on any



particular future day; sometimes we even caught the out-stations making mistakes in their own system. Some worked with a list of 31 different calls which repeated itself every month. Some had two such lists, one for odd and one for even months. One system was worked out with such little forethought that a spy once had to call with the international distress signal, SOS. This was one of the systems that determined call letters in connection with the cipher key for the day, a connection that sometimes led our part-time cryptanalysts into the decipherment of messages.

One group, we learned from one of its indiscreet first messages sent blind, based its calls and transposition cipher on the Albatross edition of Axel Munthe's *The Story of San Michele*, a book excluded by copyright arrangements from the British Empire and the United States, using a different page each day. The page to be used was determined by adding to a constant number assigned each agent the number of the month and that of the day in question. The last line on this page contained the calls to be used—the first three letters, reversed, for the control center and the last three, reversed, for the out-station. An example of this procedure may be of interest.

Shortly before midnight, eastern standard time, on March 12, 1942, one of our monitors at Laredo, Texas, copies the following slow hand-keyed message on 11,220 kilocycles.

VVVV EVI EVI EVI  
IWE OF WONUG IU VBJ DLVCP NABRS CARTM IELHX YEERX  
DEXUE VCCXP EXEEM OEUNM CMIRL XRTFO CXQYX EXISV  
NXMAH GRSML ZPEMS NQXXX ETNIX AAEXV UXURA FOEAH  
XUEUT AFXEH EHTEN NMFXA XNZOR ECSEI OAIN E MRCFX  
SENSD PELXA HPRE

We know from our analysis of previous messages that the call EVI is due to be used by an operator of the San Michele group whose assigned constant number is 56. Checking, we add the month and day—this would be March 13 by Greenwich Mean Time—and turn to page 72 of the novel. The last word on the page is "give," so EVI is right. The first word on the last line is "like"; the control center will sign KIL.

The message sent in the early hours of March 13 was probably enciphered on March 12, so we go back to page 71, shown here opposite, for the key. Here the first line reads, "I would

I would have known how to master his fear, and would have been the stronger of the two as I have been in later years more than once, when I have stayed a hand clutching a revolver in fear of life.

When will the anti-vivisectionists realize that when they are asking for total prohibition of experiments on living animals they are asking for what it is impossible to grant them? Pasteur's vaccination against rabies has reduced the mortality in this terrible disease to a minimum and Behring's anti-diphtheric serum saves the lives of over a hundred thousand children every year. Are not these two facts alone sufficient to make these well-meaning lovers of animals understand that discoverers of new worlds like Pasteur, of new remedies against hitherto incurable diseases like Koch, Ehrlich and Behring must be left to pursue their researches unhampered by restrictions and undisturbed by interference from outsiders. Those to be left a free hand are besides so few that they can be counted on one's fingers. For the rest no doubt most severe restrictions should be insisted upon, perhaps even total prohibition. But I go further. One of the most weighty arguments against several of these experiments on living animals is that their practical value is much reduced, owing to the fundamental difference from a pathological and physiological point of view between the bodies of men and the bodies of animals. But why should these experiments be limited to the bodies of animals, why should they not be carried out on the living body of man as well? Why should not the born criminals, the chronic evil-doers, condemned to waste their remaining life in prison, useless and often dangerous to others and to themselves, why should not these inveterate offenders against our laws be offered a reduction of their penal servitude if they were willing to submit under anæsthetics to certain experiments on their living bodies for the benefit of mankind? If the judge, before putting on the black cap, had in his power to offer the murderer the alternative between the gallows and penal servitude for so and so many years, I have little doubt there would be no lack of candidates. Why should not Doctor Woronoff, the practical value of his invention be

have known how to master his fear" etc. We take the first nine letters and number them in sequence:

I W O U L D H A V  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Substituting these figures in the first four groups, with nulls for any missing letters, we get

I	W	E	O	F	W	O	N	U	G	I	U	V	B	J	D	L	V	C	P
1	2	x	3	x	2	3	x	4	x	1	4	9	x	x	6	5	9	x	x

or "12 March, 2304 hours, 149 letters in 659th message following." There are actually 154 letters following, but the first group of five is simply a special indicator identifying the agent.

This is as far as the RID needed to go for its own purposes before turning the message over to the FBI. But the text could be worked out from the same page of the novel. Lay out a blank message in lines of twenty letters each, keeping the columns straight. 149 letters in rows of 20 make nine columns of eight letters each followed by eleven columns of seven each. Write across the top the first twenty initial letters of the lines on page 71, skipping indented lines. Number these in alphabetical sequence, and then go down the columns in the indicated order with the encrypted text. This arrangement gives the clear German text:

i	b	m	r	a	a	t	m	a	t	s	u	n	e	u	f	f	n	p	t
8	4	9	14	1	2	16	10	3	17	15	19	11	5	20	6	7	12	13	18
S	P	R	U	C	H	x	S	E	C	H	S	N	U	L	L	x	V	O	N
V	E	S	T	A	x	A	N	x	S	T	E	I	N	x	x	Q	U	E	E
N	x	M	A	R	Y	x	Q	U	E	E	N	x	M	A	R	Y	x	A	M
x	E	L	F	T	E	N	x	E	I	N	S	A	C	H	T	x	U	H	R
M	E	Z	x	M	E	Z	x	V	O	N	D	A	M	P	F	E	R	x	C
A	M	P	E	I	R	O	x	C	A	M	P	E	I	R	O	x	A	U	F
H	O	E	H	E	x	R	E	C	I	F	E	x	R	E	C	I	F	E	x
G	E	M	E	L	D	E	T	x											

In English:

TEXT SIXTY FROM VESTA TO STEIN. QUEEN MARY REPORTED OFF RECIFE BY STEAMSHIP CAMPEIRO ON ELEVENTH AT EIGHTEEN O'CLOCK MIDDLE EUROPEAN TIME.

# *The Latin American Infestation*

The Queen Mary message, from an agent in Rio de Janeiro, came at a moment of climax in RID's most active and critical theater of counterespionage operations, Latin America. There were in March of 1942 six agent transmitters in Rio

alone, and three of them reported the Queen Mary's arrival on the twelfth. The espionage messages were full of news about her until after she sailed on March 20, but these were the last messages most of the agents sent. By the time she was again in mid-Atlantic on a safely altered course, the Brazilian authorities had arrested some 200 of the German spies. The story behind this roundup is first of all an RID story.

Signs of the Nazi effort to create an espionage base in Latin America began to be apparent as early as the fall of 1940. On October 27 our primary station at Allegan, Michigan, picked up a strange maritime signal using the unregistered call BCNL. Other monitoring posts were alerted, and quite a number of similar calls were traced to ships in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. The FCC's Tampa office succeeded in identifying these vessels as small ones operated by a firm called Gough Bros. and controlled by a coastal station near Belize in British Honduras. The U.S. Caribbean Defense Command, after developing evidence that this fleet was being used to refuel German submarines and pass information, arrested a Canal Zone employee who was a member of the ring and was able to arrange a trap for nineteen others, including the ringleader, prominent British shipping executive George Gough, in Belize.

Meanwhile in Mexico a German spy was sending out intelligence reports in private code over Chapultepec Radio, the same transmitter used for clandestine communication with Berlin during the first world war.<sup>3</sup> After Pearl Harbor, when the use of code on commercial facilities was prohibited in Mexico, this man, a properly registered amateur, resorted to his own clandestine radio, but made the mistake of communicating first with the FBI's deception station on Long Island.

The concerted German drive to establish radio agent nets in this hemisphere, however, and our struggle against them, began in the spring of 1941. One of our monitors at Millis, Massachusetts, detected the faint signals of a station that was trying to hide its transmission in a transatlantic radio-telephone circuit operating on the same frequency. It was repeating the call letters REW, but the signal sounded quite like that of AOR, the FBI-operated Sebold transmitter's re-

<sup>3</sup> See H. O. Yardley's *The American Black Chamber*.

spondent. Other monitoring stations, asked to help identify the suspicious and noise-shrouded signal, discovered that when REW paused to listen a station on a different frequency would start sending the call letters PYL. The two transmitters put on the same performance at the same hour the next day, and for several days; they were apparently trying without success to communicate with each other. One of our monitors became so engrossed that he wanted to go on the air and help them out. Our fixes showed that REW was indeed in Hamburg, and PYL in Valparaíso, Chile, an espionage station discovered before it could make contact with its base.

For the present, however, there was nothing that could be done about agent radios outside U.S. jurisdiction except to listen in, and more and more of them began to appear, setting up in a half dozen of the Latin American republics. Chile and Brazil held the principal concentrations at this time. There were three main agent networks in Brazil, centered on transmitters that we designated LIR, CEL, and CIT, from the call signs they were using when first heard; the EVI of our decipherment example was LIR. Evidence of the damage they could do began to mount.

The German control stations, for example, sent exhaustive lists of requirements for naval information, asked PYL in Chile if it could "place a suitable man for us among students going to the United States for air training," complimented agents as "exceptionally correct" in their reports on technical details of English and American cruisers' equipment, and assigned agents to investigate "USA parade and air bases Colombia and Venezuela" and "air units Trinidad and Lesser Antilles and flights via those places to West Africa; airplane types, movement, dates." The agent radios sent back reports like these:

5 JULY. NINE BOEINGS FLEW WITH MIXED CREW ENGLISH AND AMERICANS. IN NEXT FEW WEEKS 20 MORE TO BE FLOWN ACROSS. DETAILS FOLLOW.

19 JULY. LM REPORTS 15 LOCKHEED HUDSONS FLEW ACROSS. ENGLISH REGISTRY AND CANADIAN-AUSTRALIAN CREW. BOEING CLIPPER LEFT NATAL ON SEVENTH ALLEGEDLY FOR BOLANO WITH 19 LOCKHEED MECHANICS AND 11 CREW.

7 AUGUST. USA STEAMER URUGUAY ON LAST VOYAGE TO UNITED STATES LEFT RIO 25 JUNE. WAS CONVOYED BY BRITISH AUXILIARY CRUISER CARNARVON CASTLE TO TRINIDAD. TRIP TAKES 7 DAYS. CRUISER TRAVELED SOMETIMES AHEAD SOMETIMES ASTERN OF SS URUGUAY.

8 OCTOBER. BMM REPORTS SEVERAL HUNDRED US AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS TYPES AND 8000 SPECIAL TROOPS ALLEGEDLY LANDING CORPS BEING ASSEMBLED PORT OF SPAIN.

In November PYL identified a network courier as "daughter of Clarke, secretary in USA embassy Quito since 1 November." And ten days after Pearl Harbor an agent offered details on the torpedo safety nets with which ships were being equipped and also "absolutely safe men . . . who will send to bottom two or three large armed English ships . . . without any suspicion falling on us. If we are interested payment only after sinking, nothing in advance." The control station in Germany of course approved: "Proposal for destruction of ships very interesting." Reports on plane production also now began in earnest:

1 JANUARY. CURTISS COLUMBUS FACTORY WILL BEGIN MASS PRODUCTION SERIES SB2C SINGLE SEATER STUKA FOR NAVY. ARMAMENT ONE CANNON FIVE MACHINE GUNS, MOTOR 1700 HP WRIGHT. BUILT FOR 2000 HP WRIGHT IN EXPERIMENTAL STAGE. PRODUCTION SO3C BEGUN IN COLUMBUS FACTORY AT BEGINNING DECEMBER. EMPLOYEES ALL CURTISS AIRCRAFT FACTORIES DECEMBER TOTAL 27000. PROPELLER PRODUCTION NOVEMBER 1042.

Our Government finally took action. On January 15, 1942, the Rio conference of foreign ministers of the American republics recommended immediate measures to eliminate the clandestine stations. An Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense was established with headquarters in Uruguay, and under its auspices we dispatched some of the best RID monitoring officers to the six countries where we knew agent radios to be operating (Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Cuba, Martinique, Paraguay). They had a two-fold mission—to locate the hide-outs of known agent transmitters with mobile direction-finding equipment they took along, and to help the governments of these countries establish monitoring networks which could keep them free of radio spies in the future.

For this second purpose we sent men also to six other countries (Haiti, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay). Forty men from eighteen Latin American republics were at the same time brought here for training at our school in Laurel, Maryland.

The man we sent to Brazil was Robert D. Linx. He helped lay the groundwork for that arrest of 200-odd spies after the Queen Mary left her dock in March. This roundup apparently cleaned out the LIR and CIT organizations, the latter led by a man named Christiansen; they were never heard again. Some members of the CEL net escaped to the interior, but two series of arrests after they ventured twice at intervals to reactivate their transmitter put an end to them too. By mid-year Brazil was permanently cured of its agent radio infestation. Linx stayed on to direct the establishment of the monitoring service, and became known as "the father of Brazilian monitoring."

Although our men in Latin America worked quietly by themselves as much as possible, the German agents were not always unaware of what was going on. We heard one of them telling his control that he knew at least six Yankee direction finders were beamed on him and he was going to cool off in the woods for a while. (He cooled off in a Central American jail.) In Chile, the PYL organization took the precaution of establishing a stand-by transmitter to assure continuity of communication if one should be seized. On March 9 PYL sent a message informing Hamburg that "Pedro," whom they had employed to operate the new transmitter, would be ready to get on the air the following day. On March 10, although RID had not yet received the decrypted text of this message, our monitors picked up Pedro's test transmission with the call GES and fixed his location in Antofagasta.

The arrival of our man, John de Bardeleben, in Valparaíso on March 19 was the signal for the main PYL transmitter to go mobile. De Bardeleben spent weeks tracking its changing locations in the area within a ten-mile radius of Valparaíso. It developed that every second week, however, a transmission would be made from the house at Avenida Alemana 5508, Cerro Alegre. This house belonged to one Guillermo Zeller, a radio technician and licensed amateur who was often

seen in the company of Hans Blume, manager of the Valparaíso branch of the German company Transradio. In April 1941, shortly before PYL was first heard trying to contact REW, Blume had bought from the radio supply store Casa Widow a complete set of transmitter parts and two Halli-crafter receivers. A tap was now placed on the Zeller telephone.

The Chilean authorities were persuaded to raid the Zeller house on June 25. Their perfunctory search discovered no transmitter, but Zeller was indiscreet enough to telephone afterwards to one of his agent colleagues and report his narrow escape: "Lucky they didn't search very good, especially in the basement." With some trouble and delay another search warrant was obtained, again to no avail; the officers didn't bother to open a box they noticed in the basement purporting to contain a sewing machine. PYL went off the air after this, and nothing could be done until after many weeks De Bardeleben found the transmitter in its sewing-machine box stored in a grocery on Cerro Alegre. Finally, on October 23, most of the agents of the PYL organization were arrested; but the man who actually operated the main transmitter and operator Pedro at Antofagasta had disappeared.

Neutralist Argentina, which did not participate in the Emergency Advisory Committee, posed a delicate diplomatic problem with respect to the elimination of clandestine enemy transmitters, and one of critical importance as the clean-up in Brazil and Chile made the Argentine the main base for espionage activity in this hemisphere. Not only agent radios but the powerful Argentine commercial transmitters were carrying quantities of compromising information to Italy, Japan, and Germany, and we could only copy their transmissions, hundreds of messages daily. Many of these were at speeds too high for manual copy; we recorded them on tape and trained selected typists to put them into page form. A strong memorandum from the U.S. Government on January 4, 1943, enabled us to send two men to Argentina to try to do what we had done in Brazil and Chile, but our earlier successes were not repeated here. The agent operations had become much more sophisticated. While our men were taking bearings on a signal the transmission would be cut off at



that location and picked up by another transmitter several miles away. And the cooperation of Argentine officials under the Castillo and Ramirez-Peron regimes was less than eager. They finally became so resentful of U.S. Government pressures that we had to withdraw our men.

One spy who escaped in Chile, however, did not get as far as Argentina. Almost a year after the incomplete catch of the PYL ring in Chile, monitors at three different RID posts heard a new station with the call PQZ, and all three were sure they recognized the fist of operator Pedro of the GES station at Antofagasta. Bearings placed the transmitter at Santiago, Chile.

De Bardeleben's successor in Chile, William Fellows, was notified, and he picked up the signal the next time it came on the air. Working alone, he had to move around and take bearings from different locations in order to get a fix; but after two more PQZ transmissions he had the house located. To my considerable personal satisfaction the operator Pedro, a graduate of the Hamburg spy school, who had the effrontery to use my own initials as his clandestine call, was arrested and his equipment seized. With this postlude there ended, except for the Argentine hold-out, the story of radio spies in the Americas.

*Intelligence, deception, and unorthodox stay-behind operations in a combined and all but real-war combat exercise.*


## OPERATION PORTREX

Edwin L. Sibert

There used to be some truth in the gibe that a war's first battles are fought with the weapons and techniques (including intelligence techniques) of the final engagements of the last previous war. Now, however, the practice of conducting large-scale and realistic maneuvers in time of peace, incorporating new developments not only in weapons and tactics but also in intelligence, psychological, and paramilitary devices, provides assurance that the first battles of the next war will at least be fought with the methods of the last maneuvers. One such war game in which I participated during the military doldrums between World War II and the Korean War was a particularly stimulating illustration of how realistic an exercise can be made, of some practical limitations on realism, and of the extent to which deception and unconventional operations can be worked in.

Operation Portrex wasn't so very big, as modern maneuvers go, but all elements of the armed forces—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines—took part, and there were paratroopers, frogmen, undercover agents, and guerrillas. It was staged in the first quarter of 1950 on the island of Vieques, a twenty-mile stretch of land some ten miles east of Puerto Rico. It embraced a period of more than two months devoted to preparations for a three-day assault action.

The problem of the exercise was the recapture of a hypothetical major Caribbean island which the enemy had occupied. U.S. forces were to make a combined airborne and amphibious assault on its southern beaches, represented by those of Vieques, and clean out the ten-square-mile maneuver area on this island in the initial action. The cards were stacked against the enemy defenders, who had available in the beach area only a regimental combat team reinforced by a provi-



sional armored reconnaissance unit, an engineer company, and a mixed battalion of anti-aircraft artillery, with light aviation and the support of a weak fighter wing. The invading task force consisted of the 3d Infantry Division reinforced by a battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division and a Marine Corps reconnaissance company. It had the support of a strong fighter wing based on Puerto Rico, air lift for the parachute battalion, adequate sea lift for the ground forces, and naval units for shore bombardment.

I commanded the land forces of the enemy defense, Puerto Rican regulars. In mid-December 1949 I was permitted to take them to Vieques. First we had to construct a tent camp for ourselves and the numerous visitors expected, both VIP's and run-of-the-mine; but by New Year's we were able to turn our attention to defensive works—obstacles, strongpoints, camouflage, protection against shell fire and air bombardment, deception, counterespionage, and unorthodox measures.

#### *Defenses and Deception*

The beaches called Red and Blue on the accompanying map were the major ones, the only ones big enough to accommodate a regimental combat team. But since an envelopment of our east flank was indicated by the geography of the maneuver area, we had to construct obstacles and defenses not only on these but also, less thoroughly, on the small and shallow Yellow and Green beaches. Materials and supplies might have been a problem. Vieques Island has a population of only about two thousand, mostly small farmers and poultry and cattle raisers, concentrated in a restricted central area. Its east and west ends are uninhabited training grounds. Its only town is Isabela Segunda, with one street, unpaved. Therefore all our ordinary supplies and all materials for defensive works had to come from the San Juan area in Puerto Rico by tug and barge.

Fortunately we had a sizable salvage yard at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, with a wide assortment of war surplus items such as steel landing mats, I-beams and other odds and ends of structural steel, old cable, etc. These, interspersed with felled cocoanut palm trunks and thoroughly laced with barbed wire, made formidable abatis-type obstacles. We also bulldozed out anti-tank ditches at strategic locations;

and we supplemented our limited allotment of barbed wire and screw-type steel posts for apron fences by stuffing in among them a lot of the heavy, thorny, tough brush that was prevalent in the area. I'm sure our post-maneuver popularity with the invading troops was of a low order.

Back from the beaches we burrowed as no one had since World War I, and we found that in that tropical, rain-drenched country you had to drain a ditch or dugout before it could be used. In one of the necessary departures from complete realism, we were ordered to clear all the stumps, stakes, stones, etc., from a large flat area around the airstrip behind Red beach, an obvious tip-off that this would be the drop zone for the parachute troops. I saw to it that this work was done most conscientiously: my son commanded a company in the airborne infantry battalion attached to the 3rd Division.

As we were building the defenses during January and February, the invaders were regularly taking air photographs on which to base their assault plans. In order to throw them off, we used not only camouflage but an elaborate system of dummy defenses ostensibly disposed against an expected main thrust of the invading forces north from Blue beach. These were strongpoints of ground scraped up by the bulldozers, protected by piled thorny brush, and equipped with inflated tanks and dummy guns, trucks, and communications equipment. The so-called Aggressor Cadre from Fort Riley furnished this dummy equipment and helped greatly in the deception work.

Trying to find some way to misguide the leading assault waves of landing craft, we conceived the plan of camouflaging the principal small-scale landmark in the area, an old two-story Spanish lighthouse west of the beaches, and erecting a false facsimile about a mile away. I knew our engineer, Jim Goodwin, could do it, because he could make anything; but I was forethoughtful enough about my eventual retirement pension to ask the Naval District Commandant's advice in the matter. Seldom have I seen a man so shocked; his voice shook with emotion as he dwelt on the sacredness of aids to navigation. So we had to call that off. I finally got permission to use a smoke-screen, under the proviso that it be

lifted ten minutes before the landing craft were to touch down.

A particular tricky detail in our defenses was our use of the small island that the map shows about 600 yards off Blue beach, a low and rocky one accessible by rowboat but not by landing craft. We were careful that air photographs should show us ignoring its potential as a defensive strongpoint, but we dug at its north end and heavily camouflaged a deep shelter for .50-caliber machine guns sited to fire on the beach. They were to wait until the landing craft had touched down and then open fire on the invaders from the rear; in the noise and confusion of the landing it would be some time before their fire would be identified and located, not to say suppressed.

*CI, PP, and PM Preparations*

Our attention was by no means all on hardware. We took advantage of the Puerto Rican troops' capability in Spanish to have them use it exclusively whenever there was a possibility that the American enemy would intercept their communications. We elaborated their natural difference in appearance from the U.S. forces by giving them a distinctive helmet and fatigue clothes dyed green, items provided by the Aggressor Cadre. We issued them identity folders, printed by the Aggressor Cadre, which served us as a counterespionage device and which the invaders later used as a basis for PW interrogations.

For the benefit of the enemy we put up a lot of posters with warnings about non-existent dangerous snakes and insects, as well as some existing poisonous tropical plants like the manzanillo. Our psywar effort may have been a bit on the light side though; the "1984" motif was strung through all our propaganda, and some wag even put a huge "Big Brother Is Watching You" sign up in the latrine we erected for female VIP visitors, correspondents and the WAC and WAF brass.

But the most important thing I did with respect to unconventional measures was to persuade Waller Booth, a former OSS officer living in San Juan, to come on active duty for the exercises. It was he who organized and directed an undercover net of counterespionage agents among the native resi-

dents of Vieques and who prepared a group of stay-behind guerrillas to operate within the invaders' beachhead.

About half a mile inland between Red and Blue beaches lay a heavily wooded swamp perhaps a mile in diameter, where the ground stood generally under two or three feet of water. Booth picked this place as his homey hideout for a motley crew of about sixty stay-behinds carefully selected for a variety of virtues, some of them dubious. He built a wooden walkway about six inches under water into the center of the swamp, marking its location with cryptic blazings on the trees. Here he erected above water a shelter with crude sleeping and eating facilities, storage space for supplies, and a communications center connected by hidden telephone lines to our main switchboard. The hideout was invulnerable to air photography and not a likely target for naval gunfire. Booth stocked it with rations, water, weapons, ammunition, and demolition material sufficient for the entire period of the maneuver. His men wore enemy uniforms.

Booth's other enterprise, the counterespionage net, showed its effectiveness as D day approached. Our security vigilantes picked up two enemy agents in Isabela Segunda, CIC men in civilian clothes posing as commercial travelers from San Juan, before they had been able to get into the defense area or send out any message. No agent ever penetrated the maneuver area.

On the two nights before D day at least a hundred enemy frogmen swarmed in to reconnoiter the beaches, but they failed to detect the machine gun nest we had hidden on the island off Blue beach. Our defenses looked from the air so formidable, however, that on D minus 1 we were ordered to detonate 100-lb. static charges of TNT among the obstacles to simulate the effects of naval bombardment. Jim Goodwin had a long and eloquent discussion with the umpires about the number and position of these detonations, and in the end they did surprisingly little damage.

#### *The Action*

On D day, the attack made a fine show coming in. But it was stopped cold by our smoke-screen, borne on a steady trade wind blowing ideally from just north of east, until we were

forced to lift it at the stipulated time. Then it was hard, slow work for the invaders to carve a foothold on the main beaches, and our machine gunners on the island off Blue beach wreaked great theoretical slaughter before their ammunition was exhausted.

Shortly after the amphibious touch-down the airborne troops were dropped in the expected area. I'll never forget the awesome beauty of those thousand parachutes opening white against the clear blue tropical sky, accented by the brilliant colors of the cargo chutes. But the airborne assault, which was supposed to link up rapidly with the other forces and proceed to wipe out the shattered defenders, was a failure. The twenty-mile-an-hour trade wind was rough on the jumpers; although there were no fatalities, some ninety men were hospitalized. The seaborne forces were so delayed by our obstacles that they couldn't come to the aid of the paratroopers, and we captured most of them. I was relieved to see my son walking around in the PW enclosure, and proud that he refused to accept a can of beer from me unless all the prisoners in the enclosure were similarly favored.

We also took prisoner the Marine Corps reconnaissance company, which had been assigned the job of protecting the invaders' east flank where our defenses were weak. We offered the Marines no opposition until they got so far inland that they were out of touch with the main forces and had exhausted their fuel and ammunition. Their capture left the enemy flank wide open to anti-tank fire and counterattack from our anti-aircraft and reserve infantry battalion operating outside the envelopment.

Along about noon of D day, at the expense of many hundreds of theoretical casualties, the main invading forces had fought their way inland past the swamp hideout of Booth's guerrillas, who now began to trickle out and mingle in their American uniforms with the enemy on the beachhead, where all of course was confusion. For the next three days, operating mostly at night, they performed all the functions of a real fifth column, with which the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine invaders were completely unprepared to cope. Their most valuable contribution was a steady flow of intelligence



to our headquarters, but some of their paramilitary exploits were more spectacular.

They put time-fused incendiary bombs in all manner of dumps along the beaches and on board beached LST's. They placed shaped charges against a cruiser lying off shore. They captured and used an enemy tank. They theoretically killed the enemy Corps and Division Commanders by simply knocking on their tent poles, handing each a musette bag "from Colonel so-and-so," saluting, and disappearing: the bags held simulated bombs timed for something like thirty seconds. They captured officers carrying communications instructions for directing field artillery and naval gun fire, data which by the end of the maneuver had almost got us, the defenders, accepted into the invaders' naval gun radio net, and had actually enabled us to make the enemy field artillery fire in places of our own choosing.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of his set-backs and losses, the invader succeeded, using a clever night operation which had been rehearsed at Fort Benning, in gaining a lodgment on VIP hill by about midnight after D day.<sup>2</sup> Having intelligence of his strength

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<sup>1</sup> That these small off-beat operations can sometimes yield disproportionate results was brought home to me again later, in Korea during the last Red push in the summer of 1953. In the Seoul-Inchon area a couple of light enemy aircraft were making a series of inconsequential night-time intrusions, flying low so they were almost impossible to intercept. Since they did little or no damage, however, they were shrugged off and left to the quadruple mounted .50-caliber machine guns posted throughout the area. At Inchon one of these gun posts, sandbagged on a knoll, guarded a great dump of oil in 55-gallon drums, fuel which would be needed by our forces in opposing the current large-scale enemy offensive. One night, as one of the light intruder planes, flying low in the usual pattern, came over toward this dump, enemy agents by sniping drove the gun crew momentarily from their post. The plane dumped a sackful of incendiary grenades into the acres of piled-up oil drums, and the fat was in the fire. Only the depot commander's precaution of having stacked the drums in well-separated small piles and his prompt action in containing the fire saved us from a critical fuel shortage at a critical time. A silly little operation, one that could probably never be repeated, had come close to having very embarrassing results.

<sup>2</sup> The battalion commander in this action was Lt. Col. Joe Stillwell, Jr., now a general officer.

and fearing that morning would find us in a precarious position, I ordered at 0200 hours that an over-all withdrawal to our second position be completed before daylight. This was a large order, but it worked: dawn on D plus 1 found the enemy coming out of his corner punching wildly in the air, that is deluging our now empty old positions with a heavy artillery barrage. That day and the next we made two successful surprise counterattacks, and when the problem was called off at 0900 on D plus 3 we were still an organized force with a small reserve at hand.

Wally Booth stayed on in the service after the maneuvers, and in 1952 he was wounded while engaged in guerrilla activities on an island off the eastern coast of North Korea. I am told that one result from our efforts at Vieques was the establishment of an Army school to teach the kind of operations Wally demonstrated there. If that is true, one of the buildings at the school should be called Booth Hall.

*Personal recollections of the  
capture and show trial of an in-  
telligence chief.*

### THE LAST DAYS OF ERNST KALTENBRUNNER

The list of the 22 once exalted Nazis on trial at Nuremberg was led by the notorious names Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, and Keitel, in that order. The man who came fifth, after Robert Ley's suicide, was not well known to the public, either in Germany or abroad. The prosecution was distressed that documents bearing his signature were few and far between. His name had rarely appeared in public print. The official Reich photographer, Heinrich Hoffman, had been unable to find in his extensive collection a likeness of the man. The press kept running some other Nazi official's photo to represent him and getting mixed up about what his position and duties had been. This obscurity was fitting and proper from the professional point of view, for Ernst Kaltenbrunner had headed the at last unified Reich intelligence and security services.

Succeeding after Reinhard Heydrich's assassination in June 1942<sup>1</sup> to the chieftainship of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Kaltenbrunner inherited the RSHA's ascendancy over Admiral Canaris' Abwehr which Heydrich had achieved, and eventually, with the assistance of circumstance, he contrived to have the Abwehr completely abolished and its main remnants made the RSHA's Militaerisches Amt, to be directed along with its foreign intelligence Amt VI by Walter Schellenberg. Amt III, under Ohlendorf, was the internal Sicherheitsdienst, and Mueller's Amt IV the Gestapo. But Kaltenbrunner's main interest lay in foreign affairs: according to Schellenberg he aspired to get hold of the foreign ministry in place of Ribbentrop, whom he hated.<sup>2</sup>

He was a powerful man. Even Himmler, to whom he theoretically reported, feared him: asked in April 1945 to receive some Swedish delegates from the Jewish World Congress,

<sup>1</sup> For the story behind Heydrich's death see *Studies* IV 1, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Folke Bernadotte, *The Curtain Falls*, p. 142.

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from pg.  
A11-A29

Himmler said to Schellenberg, "How am I going to do that with Kaltenbrunner around? I should then be completely at his mercy."<sup>3</sup> (Schellenberg considered Kaltenbrunner, his immediate boss, to be one of his own "most active and dangerous enemies" and therefore worked closely with Himmler.) Kaltenbrunner, not Himmler, was entrusted with the investigation of the July 1944 attempt on Hitler. He often by-passed Himmler to report directly to Hitler, with whom he had had personal ties since childhood, and toward the end spent several hours with him daily.<sup>4</sup>

*On the Scent of the Chief Werewolf*

After the Siegfried Line was breached and Nazi Germany began to fall apart, it was said that the hard core of Party leaders and their Waffen SS would hole up in a National Redoubt which they had made ready in the Austrian Alps and from there descend to prey like werewolves on the Allied occupation forces. This bad dream, of course, never came true, and later there was a good deal of scoffing at the "myth." But at the beginning of May in 1945 there was nothing mythical about either the Werewolves or the National Redoubt. As General Walter Bedell Smith said, "We had every reason to believe the Nazis intended to make their last stand among the crags."<sup>5</sup> All of our intelligence pointed to the Alpine area east and south of Salzburg as the final fortress for the Goetterdaemmerung of the remaining Nazi fanatics. Reconnaissance photographs showed that they were installing bunkers and ammunition and supply depots in this mountain region. Interrogations of military and political prisoners indicated that government officers, ranking Party leaders, and the SS troops were moving to the Redoubt, leaving it to the Wehrmacht to stem the allied advance.

Under these circumstances the 80th Infantry Division, Third U.S. Army, was ordered back on May 3 from its meeting with the Russian troops at Steyr on the Enns river to a position

<sup>3</sup> Deposition of Walter Schellenberg, Document No. 2990-PS, November 18, 1945, Office of Chief U.S. Counsel, Nuremberg.

<sup>4</sup> Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, pp. 133, 139; Walter Schellenberg, *The Labyrinth, passim*.

<sup>5</sup> "Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions," *Saturday Evening Post*, July 13, 1946, p. 26.

[illegible]

about sixty kilometers north of the center of the National Redoubt area. I was in charge of the CIC team covering the area of the 80th Division's 319th Regiment. Interpreter Sydney Bruskin of New Haven, Connecticut, worked closely with me.

On May 5 we arrested and interrogated the Party leader of the village of Vorchdorf. He revealed that two days earlier August Eigruber, Gauleiter of Upper Austria, had passed through Vorchdorf on his way to Gmunden on Traunsee, a fashionable resort about sixty kilometers east of Salzburg in the foothills of the mountain Redoubt. Gmunden was beyond our prescribed area, but a Gauleiter was too tempting a quarry; there were only four in Austria, 42 in all the Greater Reich. So we took up the pursuit. But in Gmunden the Austrian police told us that during the previous week not only Eigruber but also Kaltenbrunner and Reichsleiter Ley of the German Labor Front had passed through. Here was big game indeed. They had been headed for the heart of the Redoubt in the Salzkammergut, a mountain fastness dotted with salt mines and extending from Attersee through St. Wolfgang and Bad Ischl to Bad Aussee in the Steiermark.

Proceeding the same day up the long Traunsee shore into the Redoubt area with a tank battalion, Sid and I were afforded the opportunity to examine a concrete manifestation of Kaltenbrunner's work, the concentration camp at Ebensee. Part of the Mauthausen extermination system built up by Kaltenbrunner when he had been the "Little Himmler" of Austria, it seemed more horrible even than Dachau or Ohrdruf. Bodies that one would never have believed could exist alive were walking around, covered with sores and lice. The filth was indescribable. Adjacent to the crematorium were rooms piled high with shrunken nude bodies, lye thrown over them to combat the stench and vermin. The excess bodies that couldn't be handled at the crematorium were hauled by the wagonload to another part of the enclosure, where they were dumped into open pits filled with a chemical solution. Worse still was the hospital, where the dying and sick had been herded for experimentation before being carted off to the crematorium. There were no beds in it; the inmates lay on shelves covered with dirty rags, groups of two or three hud-

*Kaltenbrunner's Last Days*

died together like mice to keep warm. As we entered they put out their hands and begged for food. When we told them we had none, but that the American medics and military government personnel would be along immediately, they broke down and sobbed, "We have waited for you four, five, six years. Now you come empty-handed."

On the next day, May 6, we seemed about to close in on Kaltenbrunner, the man who shared with Himmler and SS General Poehl responsibility for the whole system of Nazi concentration camps. We had pushed sixteen kilometers into the Redoubt without encountering any sign of resistance and reached Bad Ischl, home of Franz Lehar and formerly the summer residence of Emperor Franz Josef I. Here we were told "on reliable authority" that at that moment Kaltenbrunner and his wife were in Strobl, a town ten kilometers to the west. Our informant, who wore the uniform of a Wehrmacht lieutenant, was a local leader in the Austrian Freedom Movement which had sprung up in opposition to the Nazis. This Movement did in fact give invaluable aid to the CIC in tracking down the Nazi leaders: about 80% of our arrests of SS, Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst, and Party leaders in Austria were due directly to leads received from it.

The lieutenant offered to drive me to Strobl with his interpreter, a German soldier, and to have a second car with other members of the Freedom Movement follow us. Suppressing my suspicions of this quick proposal I left Sid in Bad Ischl to organize an informant net and set out with the volunteer escort. I was thankful for their Wehrmacht uniforms when we found the road clogged with remnants of General Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army retreating before the Russians. We were not bothered. The war was effectively at an end, anyway, and the main bulk of the SS, like the Wehrmacht, was glad to call a halt to the fighting; it was mostly fanatics and the underground that worried us now.

In Strobl, the burgermeister admitted in a trembling voice that the Kaltenbrunner party had been staying at an estate on the outskirts of town. We drove to this estate, parked the two cars at the entrance to the grounds, and walked from there to the house. Several men in civilian clothes followed but did not stop us. At the house we were greeted by a large

blond woman of about 38 years, who immediately acknowledged that she was Mrs. Ernst Kaltenbrunner. With her were her three young children but no husband. I informed her that she was under arrest for purposes of interrogation and, to impress the civilian bodyguard, mentioned the imminent arrival of American soldiers. We then escorted her down to the car, still followed by her silent bodyguard. At the car their leader finally spoke, in perfect English: he and his men had personally been instructed by General Kaltenbrunner to safeguard Mrs. Kaltenbrunner and the children; only yesterday, however, he had heard on the radio that General Eisenhower had ordered all civilians to turn their weapons in to local burgermeisters, and he had told his men to comply; they therefore had no means to carry out their assigned mission. It was apparent that the will to resist was gone.

Back in Bad Ischl, our informants helped us pin-point the center of the National Redoubt as being in the vicinity of the mountain town of Alt Aussee, thirty kilometers to the south and well up in the Totes Gebirge range. We took this information, and Mrs. Kaltenbrunner, back to the 80th Division command post at Voecklabruck. Interrogated, Mrs. Kaltenbrunner acknowledged that her husband had been with her at their Strobl estate as recently as May 3. He had presided over a meeting attended by the following important Nazi officials: Neubacher, ambassador to Belgrade; General Glaise-Horstenau, minister to Croatia; Gauleiter Rainer of Salzburg; RSHA foreign intelligence area chiefs Wilhelm Waneck and Wilhelm Hoettl; SS Oberfuehrer Muehlmann; Otto Skorzeny, leader of the RSHA sabotage units. Kaltenbrunner, she said, knew the Alt Aussee area well from summer visits he had made when he was the "Little Himmler" of Austria. She described him as 43 years old, six feet four inches tall, weighing 220 pounds, having a powerful build and dark features, with deep scars on both sides of his face.

A task force of tanks and infantry under Major Ralph Pearson was ordered to the Alt Aussee area, and I was instructed to join them there. It was now V-E day. Sid Bruskin and I left Voecklabruck at four in the morning on May 9. As we drove up over the Poetschen pass, it was difficult to keep our minds on the mission, so beautiful was the scenery. The



road led up beside a rushing mountain stream that cascaded merrily down the rocks in steep descent, its spray sparkling in the early morning sun. Above and around us were snow-capped peaks, and the green alms on either side were brightly splashed with mountain flowers. We rested in Bad Aussee and then climbed the last four kilometers into Alt Aussee, a town of 4,000 at the end of a winding mountain road, the last village in the ascent up the Totes Gebirge. Nestled on the west shore of Alt Ausseersee, it looks across the deep, cold lake to the Trisslwand Peak on the east and over the Loser Alm on the north shore to the snowcapped summit of the Totes Gebirge range.

Alt Aussee was for the Viennese what Lake Tahoe is for Californians. Three Gauleiters—Henlein, Jury, and Eigruber—had their summer homes there. Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, the largest landowner in the Salzkammergut, was born and now lived there. Prince Hohenlohe, who had lived for a decade in New York with an American wife, made transparent attempts to ingratiate himself with us. He got us living quarters in the Hotel Eibl and offices in one of his villas down the street. He invited us to tea and apologized for his poor hospitality, saying that the Nazis made him live in his barn. (Later he was arrested for interrogation, after Kaltenbrunner told 12th Army Group interrogators that he had been Ribbentrop's observer in Spain and Portugal and had produced a mine of information regarding the United States and Latin America.<sup>6</sup>)

We established an informant net from our "white list" of anti-Nazis and the most knowledgeable and trustworthy members of the Freedom Movement. This latter group was headed by Johann Brandauer, the assistant burgermeister. Rumors were rife that Kaltenbrunner, Ley, Eigruber, Kreisleiter Stichnot of Gmunden, and strong groups of SS troops and high SS officers were hiding out in the recesses of the Totes Gebirge. From May 9 to May 11 we worked sixteen or eighteen hours a day trying to get some clue to Kaltenbrunner's whereabouts.

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<sup>6</sup> HQ 12th Army Group Intermediate Interrogation Report, June 28, 1945.

Our first important contact was with Albrecht Gaiswinkler, a British agent who had been parachuted into the area on April 20. A native of Bad Aussee, he had been drafted into the Wehrmacht, had deserted in France, turning a Nazi supply train over to the French Maquis, and when the Third Army liberated Alsace had given himself up to the Americans. The Americans had turned him over to the British, to whom the Aussee area was allocated for future occupation. Gaiswinkler had learned that Wilhelm Waneck, Chief of the RSHA Intelligence Section for Southeastern Europe—and one of Kaltenbrunner's May 3 conferees at Strobl—was now operating a wireless transmitting station in the Kerry Villa located on a hill at the outskirts of Alt Aussee. Working with Waneck were his deputy, Wilhelm Hoettl, (another of the conferees), Werner Goettsch, who had earlier held Waneck's job and now was a sort of chief ideologist for the RSHA, and a number of other Nazi officials.

Thanks to Gaiswinkler's effective groundwork, Sid and I were able to arrest this group, seal its headquarters at the Kerry Villa, and stop the operation of its transmitter. We did not know then that this was the central communications center for the National Redoubt and Kaltenbrunner's only connection with the outside world; its importance and the feverish activities of the Goettsch-Waneck group during the preceding month were revealed only later after detailed interrogation of the principals. For the moment our attention was all on locating Kaltenbrunner, and these people gave no leads on his whereabouts except the information that he had been at Alt Aussee on May 3.

We located and arrested many lesser Nazis who had fled to Alt Aussee, seeking for the most part time to collect their thoughts and prepare their anti-Nazi alibis—Gunter Altenburg, Minister Plenipotentiary to Greece; General Erich Alt of the Luftwaffe; Joseph Heider, who had been detailed by Eigruber to blow up the Alt Aussee salt mines wherein was stored a fabulous collection of looted art treasures for the projected Great Hitler Museum in Linz; Dr. Hjalmar Mae, head of the puppet state in Esthonia; Walter Riedel, construction chief for the V-2 weapons at Peenemuende; Ernst Szargarus, Foreign Office secretary in Rome; Spiros Hadji Kyriakos,

Under Governor of the National Bank of occupied Greece; William Knothe, General Counsel of the Foreign Office; Dr. Carlos Wetzell, head of the pharmaceutical industry; and Dr. Bailent Homan, minister in the Hungarian puppet government.

As we cast about during those three days for traces of Kaltenbrunner's movements, we sorted out the diverse social groups in Alt Aussee, each busy trying to establish its anti-Nazi premise. There was the artist's group, with movie actors Ernst von Klipstein and Lotte Koch, the Viennese theater star Unterkirchner, the aged composer Wolf-Ferrari, the sensational pianist-composer-conductor Peter Kreuder, self-styled "Cole Porter of Germany," the composer and conductor Nico Dostal, the Austrian tenor and movie star Johannes Heesters, and many members of the Vienna symphony orchestra. More intriguing from the CIC viewpoint was the old German nobility group of Countess Platen and Herbert von Hindenburg, nephew of the Field Marshal, because they had living with them one Jean Schils, a Dutch intelligence man who claimed to have been a member of the anti-Nazi underground, and a certain Norman Bailey-Stewart. Schils gave us several false leads on "V-3 weapons" supposed to be located nearby in a Russian-occupied area, and seemed in general bent on provoking incidents between the Russians and the Americans.

One day Schils came into the office to volunteer information on the whereabouts of Gauleiter Eigruber and brought Bailey-Stewart along as his interpreter. It soon became apparent that Bailey-Stewart was deliberately misinterpreting everything Schils said, and he was acting very abnormally. About 35 and unusually good-looking, he showed his impatience with the dullness of the business at hand. I questioned him alone, and he turned out to be England's famous "Officer in the Tower" of the thirties, eager to tell the world the sequel to those early espionage activities—his work for the Nazis in the war just ending.

In 1932, according to his account, returning as a second lieutenant from duty in India, he was disillusioned with England's imperial policy. He volunteered for the German secret service and was sent back to London to collect order-of-battle information. Discovered through the alertness of the Eng-

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lish censors, he was tried amid much publicity and sentenced to five years in the Tower of London. When his family's influence obtained his release in 1936 he went to Vienna, watched now not only by the English secret service but also by the Gestapo and Schuschnigg's and Skubl's Austrian police. He applied for Austrian citizenship. The English picked him up in 1938 and accused him of smuggling arms into Austria to help the then illegal Nazi Party. The charges were not proved, however, and with the Anschluss he became a German citizen. In the same year he was questioned by RSHA agents about his criticism of Nazi propaganda beamed to England, and his criticism was so good that he was flown to Berlin and given a job in the Rundfunk, where in 1939 he began what were to become later, under William Joyce, the Lord Haw Haw programs. But about this time he was reported to have made remarks detrimental to the Nazi State, and he became involved in personal antagonisms. Through a friend in the Foreign Ministry he was given a job in its wireless department. In March 1944 he was sent to Vienna. In December, having been called to service in the Volksturm, he gave a false address and departed for Alt Aussee.

All this was very interesting, but it did not advance the Kaltenbrunner chase. We arrested Bailey-Stewart on behalf of the British and went back to our job. The most promising set of people in Alt Aussee for our purposes was the one comprising Countess Gisela von Westarp, Iris Scheidler, and Dr. Rudolf Praxmarar.

Gisela von Westarp was Kaltenbrunner's mistress. A pretty blonde of twenty-two with blue eyes, vivacious and extremely intelligent, she had been working at Himmler's Berlin headquarters when Kaltenbrunner came from Vienna in early 1943 to take over the RSHA. On March 12, 1945, she bore him twins, Ursula and Wolfgang, in a cowshed in Alt Aussee. I still have a letter she wrote to her mother describing the event, declaring that she "almost deserved the Mother Cross," and pointing out that Mrs. Kaltenbrunner had taken twelve years to produce only three children. One of the twins' godfathers, Gisela told me proudly, was Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Karl Brandt.

Iris Scheidler was the wife of Arthur Scheidler, formerly adjutant to Heydrich and now to Kaltenbrunner. She was thirty years old, an attractive society brunette, seemingly intent on having a good time. She and Gisela were good friends with many of those in the Hitler inner circle, especially Heinrich Hoffman, the Reich photographer who had introduced Eva Braun to Hitler, Eva Braun herself, Baldur von Schirach, Hitler Youth leader and later Gauleiter of Vienna, and Herman Fegelein, the SS General who acted as liaison officer between Hitler and Himmler.

Dr. Rudolph Praxmarar had once been Iris' husband, and they still had great affection for each other. He had been a classmate and friend of Kaltenbrunner's at the University of Graz and then became a prominent physician in Vienna. Now he was the SS Chief of Hospitals and military commander of Alt Aussee. He was about 50 years old, with a genial personality and the reputation of being a great sportsman. But we received from Freedom Movement informants in the SS hospitals an accusation against him signed by members of his own staff. It read in part:

Until two days prior to the entry of the American Task Force into Alt Aussee, Praxmarar kept active association with the bloodhound Kaltenbrunner. He has not been afraid to shelter him in the hospital and provide him with medicines and food and weapons. Arms were loaded into a car at night to help Kaltenbrunner escape to the mountains. Praxmarar, prior to the arrival of the Americans, tried to force several of the patients into the Kampfgruppe Kaltenbrunner for the purpose of staging a last stand in the mountains. He also tried to get one hundred men from Georg [Gaiswinkler] for the same purpose. Under the pretext of angina pectoris he took into the safety of his hospital the Kaltenbrunner Gestapo chief in Vienna, SS Brigadier General Huber.

We found Huber still in the hospital and arrested him. Praxmarar we didn't arrest until several days later, when we had received further proof of his complicity with Kaltenbrunner.

#### *The Quarry Taken*

Finally, on the morning of May 11, we received our first solid piece of information on the location of Kaltenbrunner's hideout. Johann Brandauer reported that the Alt Aussee forest ranger—a member of the Freedom Movement—had seen

General Kaltenbrunner, Scheidler, and two SS guards five days before in a cabin called Wildensee Huette atop the Totes Gebirge. Though the tip was five days old, it had the merit of coming from a reliable source: Brandauer was one of our closest and most trustworthy collaborators. I therefore asked him to bring me immediately two reliable Austrians who knew the mountain trails to serve as guides.

Brandauer brought not two but four Austrian guides, all former Wehrmacht soldiers. They said it would take us five hours to reach the cabin. There would still be from twenty to thirty feet of snow on the ground, and no cover for us except drifts on the last four kilometers of the way up to the cabin. We would have to leave before midnight to arrive under cover of darkness and while the crust on the snow was still hard. I would dress in Austrian costume—lederhosen, Alpine jacket and hat, and spiked shoes. I would approach the cabin alone; the Austrians were not willing to come closer than five hundred yards. I would go up unarmed so as not to draw fire or arouse suspicion. I would pose as a passer-by crossing the mountains on the way to Steyring, in the next valley: there were many Wehrmacht deserters and fleeing Nazis whose safest and most expedient mode of travel was by foot over the mountains. If Kaltenbrunner was not there I would come out immediately.

This was a sensible plan. That it was executed stumblingly was due to the fact that Major Pearson, the task force commander, insisted on sending a squad of his boys along. I was afraid their presence might bring on a pitched battle, leaving either a dead or an escaped Kaltenbrunner, and my arguments achieved at least the compromise agreement that I would have authority to use the infantry squad in any manner I saw fit. I ordered it to stay well to the rear and on the approach to the cabin keep under cover out of sight.

After this matter had been arranged, on the afternoon of the eleventh, I sent for Gisela. She was extremely anxious to find out what information we had regarding Kaltenbrunner. I told her we had some leads and asked her to write a note to him urging him to accompany the bearer into safe custody with the Americans rather than let himself be taken, and probably killed, by the Russians. After a moment's

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thought she complied. Later that afternoon we were visited by several delegations from the Gisela-Iris group—first Hans Unterkirchner, the Viennese actor, then Lotte Koch and Ernst von Klipstein, then Praxmarar and Iris—all fishing for information.

Iris was apparently most concerned about the safety of her husband Arthur Scheidler. Although she was going to have a baby in six weeks, she insisted that she be allowed to accompany any patrol that might go off into the mountains after him, arguing that if she were in evidence there would be no shooting on the part of the Kaltenbrunner group. Thinking that she might indeed be useful in this way, I told her she could come; but then she backed down. Never quite sure what the maneuverings of these friends of Kaltenbrunner might mean, I sent Sid to the Gisela-Iris house to keep an eye on them for the next twelve hours.

That night at 11:30 p.m. the patrol assembled in the CIC office for final briefing. The infantry boys, although they had volunteered for this mission, were a little dubious about the plan as outlined, and especially about being guided by former German soldiers. They wanted it made clear that if they made a single false step the guides would be dead ducks; after coming through the war alive they didn't want to get killed with peace and home in sight.

As we started off at midnight the squad of soldiers loaded with their rifles, hand grenades, and ammunition seemed to make as much noise as a company of tanks rolling through the streets; it would be evident to the village people that a patrol was leaving. We walked past the See Hotel, where one of Praxmarar's SS hospitals was quartered, past Fischern-dorf, along the Alt Ausseersee shore, and then began to climb. There were unexpected obstacles: trees swept down by heavy snowslides lay across the path, and the foot bridge over the Stammern stream had been carried away in the spring floods. Up through the timber, up past the timber line we wound our way, snake-like over the hairpin trail. The infantry, weapon-laden and without spiked shoes, slowed us down, and it was soon clear that we could not keep to our schedule. Three of the soldiers, injured by falls, were dropped along the way.

At 5 a.m., as day began to touch the sky, we finally reached a snow-covered pass from which through glasses we could see the Wildensee Huetten. It lay across a great expanse of exposed down-slope and then up a long bare ridge, just below the crest. We nevertheless decided to proceed directly, in full view, rather than take a circuitous route to gain cover from overhanging crags. It was getting late; everybody was thoroughly tired from breaking through the crust calf-deep at every step; and the cabin appeared to be utterly deserted.

Behind a ridge of snow some 300 yards from the cabin I left the four Austrian guides and what remained of the infantry squad and worked my way around to the blind west side of the cabin, taking advantage of any cover there was. As I was laughing at myself for being so cautious in approaching an evidently deserted cabin, I heard a bird-call signal off to the right. No, it *was* a bird, apparently as lonesome as I felt. The cabin, I could see, was a typical Alpine hut—two rooms, a wood shelter, a porch that faced down the slope in the direction we had come. The shutters were tight closed; no smoke was coming from the chimney; no fresh foottracks were visible in the snow.

I walked onto the porch and knocked at the door. There was no response. I tried the door and found it locked. But then a sleepy groan came from the left-hand room. I knocked loudly on the window shutter. Someone got out of bed and walked across the room. The shutter opened, revealing a rough-looking man of about 35, not Kaltenbrunner. "Was suchen?" he asked. I said in very American-sounding German that I was cold and wanted to come in. But he clearly wasn't going to ask me in, so I came straight to the point and handed him Gisela's note to Kaltenbrunner.

He read it carefully, but then said he didn't know these people, he was just a passer-by on his way down to Bad Ischl. At that moment he looked over my shoulder down the slope, and saw the four guides coming up with rifles slung over their shoulders; observing that nothing had happened to me, they had decided that there was no danger. He quickly crossed the room and took a revolver from his trousers hanging beside the bed. I retreated to the protection of the cabin's west side, and he slammed the shutter shut. The guides, alarmed,



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brought the eight infantry boys up in a half-circle around the front of the cabin. While this maneuver was being executed, the man in the cabin opened the door and came out on the porch, perhaps to negotiate, but when he saw the reinforcements he quickly reentered, slamming and bolting the door behind him.

With the men in position, we called out to the occupants to come out with their hands over their heads. For ten minutes we kept repeating this call, with no results. Not wishing to start shooting, we went onto the porch and began to knock down the door. But immediately it opened and four men walked out with their hands over their heads. They had decided to come peacefully after all.

Inside the cabin we found four Wehrmacht rifles, four revolvers, a large quantity of ammunition, two machine pistols, and a machine gun, the latter hidden in the recess of the chimney. Also a case of empty champagne bottles, some French bonbons, some American tax-free cigarettes, and a large quantity of counterfeit American and British money. In the ash pit at the base of the chimney was a picture of Kaltenbrunner with his wife and children, a copy of his last radio message to Fegelein for Himmler and Hitler, his identification card as Chief of the SIPO and SD, and his metal identification discs as number two man (Himmler was number one) of the Gestapo and the Kriminalpolizei.

I interrogated each of the four men. Two of them admitted they were SS guards, but claimed they had no connection with Kaltenbrunner. And Kaltenbrunner and Scheidler, although there was no mistaking at least the former, refused to admit their identities. They had false papers, Kaltenbrunner those of a doctor discharged from the Wehrmacht, and he carried a medical kit and all the usual accessories. (Later he took pains to explain that these papers were not forged, but the authentic identification of deceased persons. This rather fine distinction was characteristic of his efforts to appear an Austrian gentleman and a good Catholic.) He stood rigidly at attention during the interrogation, trying to create a good initial impression by being earnest and cooperative. Scheidler was the antithesis. He made no attempt to hide his wrath.

His eyes flashed furiously at me as we swung heavy packs onto the four men for our trip down to the village.

At 11:30 in the morning we arrived back in Alt Aussee, where word had apparently circulated that a mountain patrol was returning: a crowd was gathered in the village street. As we passed Prince Hohenlohe, he remarked, "I see you have your man Kaltenbrunner," and at the same time Iris and Gisela broke from the throng and ran up and embraced their respective men. Kaltenbrunner and Scheidler now had to drop their masks.

#### *The Last Days*

In time, through the interrogation and testimony of Kaltenbrunner and others,<sup>7</sup> it was possible to piece together the story of his recent efforts to salvage something from the German defeat. On April 18 Himmler had named him Commander in Chief of all forces in southern Europe. He had reorganized his intelligence services as a stay-behind underground net, dividing the command up between Otto Skorzeny, head of the sabotage units, and Wilhelm Waneck, whose radio station in the Kerry Villa kept in contact not only with Kaltenbrunner and other centers in the Redoubt and in Germany, but also with stay-behind agents in the southern European capitals.

Waneck, however, with Werner Goettsch, Wilhelm Hoettl, and others, concluding as early as 1943 that the Nazis would lose the war, had been intriguing for a negotiated peace with the western allies and a common front against Russia. The plan was to set up an independent Austrian state in rebellion against the Nazi Reich and supported by the Anglo-Americans. Goettsch had valuable contacts among the Vienna Socialists, and one idea had been to send Karl Doppler to the United States to broach the plan because he had the same masonic degrees as President Roosevelt. Kaltenbrunner was informed of this conspiracy and gave tacit assent, though he could not actively participate. Later other Socialists were brought in, including Karl Winkler, who had contacts with

<sup>7</sup> Notably Wilhelm Hoettl (Third Army Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 17, June 1945), Wilhelm Waneck (12th Army Group Intermediate Interrogation Report, June 21, 1945), and Werner Goettsch (USFET Final Interrogation Report No. 8, July 24, 1945).

America and England through Draja Mihailovich, and Raffael Spann and Professor Heinrich, who had an excellent contact in England, their friend Major Christie at the Travellers Club, London. Attempts in 1944 to contact Major Christie by letter failed, however; and an opportunity provided by Mihailovich to get in touch with the American Legation in Belgrade was lost when Belgrade was occupied.

Finally, in March 1945, according to the interrogation reports, Hoettl went to Switzerland with the Polish Count Potocki, with whose help and that of Prince Alois Auersperg, a former Abwehr officer implicated in the July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life, he was able to get into touch with Mr. Schultze-Gaevernitz, a member of the American Embassy, and through him with Allen Dulles.<sup>8</sup> Through Auersperg and a Dr. Kurt Grimm, Austrian Freedom Movement representative, Hoettl also had contact with a Mr. Leslie of an Allied Commission in Berne. The Americans, he was told, did not want a strong Russian influence in Austria, and they were particularly interested in Kaltenbrunner's attitude toward an independent Austrian state.

With this information Hoettl, Waneck, and Goettsch were able to urge Kaltenbrunner to set up a rival Austrian government to the Russian-sponsored one in Vienna, which the western allies refused in April to recognize. Kaltenbrunner held two meetings with members of this Free Austria group—Neubacher, Glaise-Horstenau, Muehlmann, Hayler, Pschikril, Hoettl, Goettsch, and Waneck—at which a provisional cabinet was discussed and it was decided that Kaltenbrunner, in accordance with American wishes, should be an advisor. Having now full powers in southern Europe, Kaltenbrunner was in an excellent position to use his reorganized intelligence services as a bargaining counter with the Allies.

On April 26, at Strobl, Hoettl reported to Kaltenbrunner, Glaise-Horstenau, Neubacher, Muehlmann, Waneck, and Goettsch on the results of a second visit to Switzerland. It was agreed at this time to try to arrange a meeting between Allen Dulles and Kaltenbrunner at Feldkirch, in Austria near

<sup>8</sup> This approach, if it was made, was carried out by the intermediaries: Hoettl did not in fact meet with Allen Dulles, and probably not with Gaevernitz.

the Swiss border. During the next few days Kaltenbrunner met with Field Marshall Kesselring and Lieutenant General Winter at Koenigsee regarding the project. But the sands were running out; the war was coming to an unexpectedly rapid end. Kaltenbrunner could pursue the political way out no longer. Facing capture as the Russian and American troops closed in, he retired to Alt Aussee to bid Gisela farewell and from there with his two SS guards and his adjutant Scheidler made the ascent to the mountain hideout among the snowy crags of the Totes Gebirge.

Interrogated now briefly by the 80th CIC at Alt Aussee before being sent on to Third Army and 12th Army Group, Kaltenbrunner said that he had intended to come down from his retreat after things had quieted down and, on the basis of the underground forces at his command, his Free Austria project, and his knowledge of Bolshevism, come to terms with the western allies: "If there is one man in Europe who knows Bolshevism, it is I." We allowed Gisela and Iris a last tearful farewell before sending the two men on to higher headquarters. There was a plan afoot which never materialized to have Kaltenbrunner talk with General Eisenhower and then issue a statement calling on the underground to end all resistance.

During subsequent interrogations Kaltenbrunner remained very cooperative, intent on establishing his alibi. At Third Army he said that with Hitler's consent he "began in 1945 to use the foreign intelligence service to counteract Ribbentrop's pernicious influence and to find a political way out." He wrote a letter to his wife, Lisl, clearly designed for American eyes:

My own destiny lies in the hands of God. I am glad that I never separated from Him. . . . I cannot believe that I shall be held responsible for the mistakes of our leaders, for in the short time of my activity I have striven hard for a reasonable attitude, both internal and external. . . . They ought to have paid more attention to my words. . . . We have no property worth mentioning. Perhaps the only resource for you will be my small stamp collection. . . . Was it not my duty to open the door to socialism and freedom as we imagined and desired them? . . . I have not given up hope that the truth will be found out and for a just legal decision.

But he never disclaimed his positive relationship with Hitler, one apparently bordering on adoration. His subordinate Wilhelm Hoettl said of him that he "was fascinated by Hitler, believed in him without reservation . . . . He believed he had a mission to serve Hitler with his entire RSHA . . . . He came to believe that Hitler was the man sent by God. This developed into a mania."

In July Kaltenbrunner was sent to British Interrogation Center 020 outside of London. Here, at a time when the horrors of the concentration camps were being brought to light, he was seized on as the first prisoner that had played a significant and responsible part in the extermination program. He was given third-degree treatment, I learned later from an American intelligence officer working on the case. The result was that henceforth he not only did not cooperate but refused even to admit he had any responsibility at all in the Nazi system. He refused to admit that he knew men who had been his closest associates. He denied that he had ever been near a concentration camp. He refused to admit that he signed orders incarcerating persons in concentration camps. In short, he denied from this time on any connection with Nazi crimes or persons responsible for such crimes. He was flown to Nuremberg for the trial in handcuffs—the only one of the 21 major defendants treated in this manner.

In November, two weeks before the scheduled opening of the trial, I was sent to Nuremberg to set up a security plan: the American military commanders were becoming anxious about "lone-wolf assassins," and Robert Ley had succeeded in committing suicide despite supposedly elaborate precautions. To test the Palace of Justice security system, another CIC man and I tried penetrating without proper credentials to the inner cell block which housed the 21 defendants. We succeeded, as anybody might have done, in passing through the four interior guard posts without the required Red Pass. A fifth post guarded the individual cells. I asked to see Kaltenbrunner and was readily admitted upon signing the registration book.

Kaltenbrunner looked gaunt and pale. He clearly showed the effects of what he had been through since I saw him on May 12. He gave no indication of wanting to remember

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me; it seemed as if he had mesmerized himself into a state of complete forgetfulness. Only when I mentioned the name Gisela he nodded and asked several questions about her and the twins. But that was all.

On the opening day of the trial, to everyone's great disappointment, Kaltenbrunner was not in the prisoners' dock; he had been stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage the night before. It was three weeks before he was well enough to make his plea, "I do not believe I have made myself guilty in the sense of the indictment." On December 10 I was present at the scene described in the press release of the International Military Tribunal's public relations office:

Ernst Kaltenbrunner received a cool welcome from his co-defendants when he made his initial appearance at the trial Monday afternoon. Entering the prisoners' dock just before the afternoon session began, no welcoming hands were proffered to greet him. When he offered to shake hands with some of the defendants there was a noticeable reluctance on their part. Taking his seat in the dock between Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Rosenberg, he tried to engage his neighbors in a conversation without much luck. . . . When he was approached by his own defense council, Kaltenbrunner held out his hand. His lawyer had, however, with studied casualness locked his hands behind his back.

I walked down beside Kaltenbrunner during the intermission that afternoon. He recognized me and motioned that he wanted to speak with me. That was not permitted. I had received that day through the mail a note from Gisela for him, a girlish love-note telling him that his heart must never grow cold, that she was thinking of him and would always love him. I handed it to Kaufman, Kaltenbrunner's defense counsel. AP correspondent Daniel DeLuce, however, who was talking with Kaufman at the time, appropriated it and wrote a story on it. Kaltenbrunner presumably never found out that Gisela was keeping the home fires burning.

Later that week Kaltenbrunner was stricken with a recurrence of the cerebral hemorrhage, and could not return to the dock until January. But he survived through the entire trial, to be hanged on October 15, 1946, with eleven of his co-defendants.

*Achievements, extravagances,  
and exposure of a clandestine  
German interbellum operation  
in military research and devel-  
opment.*

### THE LOHMANN AFFAIR

The Weimar Republic's attempts in the twenties to circumvent the Versailles restrictions on its armed forces produced clandestine operations which in their financing, cover devices, and hazards of exposure present a close parallel with intelligence operations. One such series of undercover research and development projects, carried out by a Captain Walther Lohmann of the German Naval Transportation Division, got out of hand and became a source of acute embarrassment to the Weimar Ministry of Defense. The affair was hushed up, and in more recent times has been virtually overlooked by historians. Sufficient material is now available, however, for a scrutiny of Lohmann's work, its oddities and blunders, and for an account of the way the German Cabinet successfully veiled its true nature after some of the clandestine activities had been exposed in the press.<sup>1</sup>

Walter Lohmann, the son of a one-time director of the North German Lloyd shipping line, served inconspicuously as a non-combat logistics specialist during the European war of 1914-1918. He won recognition in navy circles afterward, how-

<sup>1</sup> The following materials were used in the preparation of this article: captured documents of the German naval staff, in custody of the Division of Naval History, U.S. Navy; the record of proceedings of the German Cabinet and documents of the German Foreign Ministry, in custody of the U.S. Department of State at the National Archives; records of the Berlin Embassy of the Department of State, now available to the public at the National Archives; documents of the German Reichstag and the files of several German newspapers, including the *Berliner Tageblatt*, available at the Library of Congress. In addition the writer has consulted the published memoirs of former German Defense Minister Otto Gessler, *Reichswehrpolitik in der Weimarer Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1958). Precise documentary citations are made in another version of this study being submitted to the *Journal of Modern History*.

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ever, for his work on a subcommission which negotiated the disposition of the German merchant fleet and for his direction of shipments of emergency food supplies to Germany. He also managed the return from overseas of German war prisoners. In 1920, while on the first of two trips to Leningrad to negotiate with the Russians regarding the release of captured German merchant ships, he met the comely German-born Frau Else Ektimov, destined later to play a role in his downfall. He subsequently arranged for the return of the lady to Germany and for her support.

In October 1920 he assumed command of the Naval Transport Division of Navy headquarters in Berlin, a post concerned primarily with logistical matters. For this reason, and also because he enjoyed the complete trust of Admiral Paul Behnke, then commander in chief of the Navy, he was given full charge in early 1923 of the disbursement of the Navy's "black" funds reserved for clandestine purposes.

#### *Achievements*

Initially, these funds included large sums—amounting in dollars to at least 25 million—obtained from the sale of warships and submarines scrapped in 1919 and 1920 at the order of the Allied Powers. Later, some two and a half million were added as the Navy's share of the so-called "Ruhr funds," monies voted by the Reichstag and used to strengthen the armed services above Treaty limit at the time of the French occupation of the Ruhr. Subsequently, smaller sums totaling about two and a quarter million were obtained or diverted from other sources. Most of this money was transmitted to recipients through a Lohmann-supported bank, the Berliner Bankverein, which acted as a middleman between the Naval Transport Division and the various projects funded.

Only one inspector, a man of Lohmann's own choice, was assigned to audit the funds, and he had no authority to question the wisdom or validity of the captain's disbursements. His presence afforded a partial check against improper bookkeeping and ordinary waste, but none to hinder Lohmann from supporting whatever projects he chose. Admiral Behnke and Minister of Defense Otto Gessler, trusting Lohmann to use the money for worthwhile undertakings, seem to have



given him *carte blanche*, an opportunity which appealed to his Hanseatic spirit.

Between 1923 and 1927 Lohmann financed nearly all of the clandestine and semi-clandestine projects of the Navy. Most of these were established with the initial concurrence of his superiors, and many required the closest cooperation with several divisions of the naval staff; but some were founded and supported solely on the captain's initiative without the knowledge of even the commander in chief of the Navy. This independent activity was protected by the necessity for strict secrecy in clandestine operations and by Lohmann's extremely broad powers.

The projects which dealt with aircraft and submarine design and development were for the most part soundly conceived, well executed, and extremely important for the future development of the Navy and the Luftwaffe. With subsidies from Lohmann, three German shipyards operated a highly successful submarine design bureau in The Netherlands which maintained contact with Navy headquarters through a dummy firm known as Mentor Bilanz. The "Dutch" bureau, Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, designed a submarine which Lohmann and Captain Wilhelm Canaris (later to become the Abwehr chief of ambivalent loyalties) in 1926 arranged to have built at Cadiz in Spain. The purpose was to train German technicians and to develop a prototype medium-size submarine, which among other features had torpedo tubes designed to eliminate the large bubble of air that normally betrayed a submarine's position when a torpedo was fired.

Lohmann's work in aircraft development was equally significant. The firms of Heinkel, Dornier, and Rohrbach enjoyed his subsidies, and in 1926 he purchased outright the Casper Aircraft Company to obtain facilities for the type-testing of "commercial" aircraft which closely resembled the fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance planes being built abroad by such firms as Boeing, Vickers, and Douglass. By 1927 Germany had several successful prototypes, and the Swiss subsidiary of Dornier was about to embark on the design and development of the "DO X" flying boat, a twelve-engine giant larger even than the famous Boeing Clippers of Pan-Ameri-

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can, to meet the requirement for a patrol seaplane capable of landing and refueling at sea. Only an unacceptably low service ceiling made it necessary to abandon this design.

The training of airmen was at the same time not overlooked. Battle-experienced pilots of the Lohmann-financed Severa flying service based at Noordney and Holtenau conducted tactical exercises with the fleet and trained a dozen young naval officers each year in the art of flying.

*Extravagances*

As Lohmann's list of projects grew—including also such things as the secret construction of motor torpedo boats and subsidies to various small-boat shipyards and yachtsmen's associations—his ambition increased proportionately. By about 1926 he seems to have become convinced that he could perfect a massive structure of clandestine projects financed by profitable commercial ventures bolstering the rapidly dwindling "black" funds. He then stepped into another world, the world of commerce and business, where his successes were lamentably few. He had become the victim of *Masslosigkeit*—gross intemperance.

Two projects which attempted to combine money-making with what might today be termed "defense-related research" bordered on the fantastic. One company was founded to exploit an experimental method of raising sunken ships by surrounding them with ice, and another sought to extract motor fuel from potatoes. These accomplished nothing, and both aroused much public ridicule when they were later exposed. Another device, a coal-pulverizing machine, came to grief in the course of experiments and the Lohmann-financed company which sponsored it went bankrupt.

But it was the Berliner Bacon Company which came to be described by German Socialists as the most oderiferous of Lohmann's schemes. This project was initiated primarily as a money-maker in the spring of 1926. Lohmann proposed to wrest from the Danes the lucrative British bacon market by offering a German product cured by a new process especially for the Englishman's palate. He had incidentally in mind that the fast refrigerator ships he hoped to acquire for the bacon trade would be useful in wartime as troop transports.

His ambitions, however, exceeded his ability to analyze the British market potential, and by mid-1927 his company was bankrupt.

Lohmann's downfall stemmed from his relations with the Phoebus Film Company, in 1927 the third largest producer of motion pictures in Germany. Beginning in 1924 Lohmann granted subsidies to this firm on condition that it produce films of a "national" character designed to stimulate the "fatherland consciousness" of the German people. He also hoped to use its overseas offices to establish an intelligence network in former enemy countries where Germany was not allowed a naval attaché.

The captain probably had personal reasons for supporting Phoebus as well. Prior to his association with the company he had become a close personal friend of one of the directors, and afterward a member of a hunting club organized by him. Through this man Lohmann secured for his friend Frau Ektimov a position with Phoebus at a salary of 1,000 marks a month, enough to enable her to support her aged mother and young son in comfort. Frau Ektimov, employed for "representation," did no work, and she had apartments in a house purchased by Lohmann. Lohmann's personal relations with her are nevertheless officially said to have been above reproach, motivated solely by a desire to help her; and *honi soit qui mal y pense*. He also seems not to have appropriated any of the "black" funds for his own use.

Between 1924 and 1927 Lohmann provided Phoebus, a company capitalized at approximately \$1,000,000, with a total of over \$2,500,000. He informed his superiors of only one of five separate grants, a government-guaranteed loan from the Giro-central Bank in Berlin in March 1926. In order to obtain their signatures on this guarantee, Lohmann resorted to a stratagem, informing them that the Lignose Company, a producer of raw film, had also guaranteed the loan and that in the event of default it would stand the loss instead of the government. He neglected to add that he had in effect bribed one of Lignose's officials with a \$2,500 "negotiating fee," and that he had given this man a written assurance that Lignose would not have to pay. In the early half of 1927 he arranged two more government-guaranteed loans which he kept secret from

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his superiors by affixing his own signature in the name of the Reich.

Despite this massive aid, Phoebus continued to lose money. In 1927 it was in such serious financial difficulties that it failed to convene its regular annual stockholders' meeting or issue a financial report. By August disaster was impending for both Lohmann and Phoebus. The company was falling behind in payments on its loans, and penalties were mounting rapidly. None of Lohmann's various money-making projects had paid off, and the "black" funds were near exhaustion.

*Exposure*

Kurd Wenkel, one of the financial writers of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, a liberal daily of high quality, had been following the declining fortunes of the German film industry with close attention. He was well aware of the financial condition of Phoebus, and by mid-July had begun to suspect that Phoebus enjoyed official support. At about this time he became acquainted with a former director of the company, Isenburg, who had resigned in disgust in 1926 and knew of Lohmann's dealings with Phoebus, of the several government-guaranteed loans, and of Lohmann's relations with Frau Ektimov. Evidently for reasons of spite he told all this to Wenkel, who took care to check the story independently and then in articles on 8 and 9 August created a sensation by exposing the shameful scandal.

Wenkel, however, was apparently not aware of Lohmann's real clandestine mission. For him the Phoebus relationship constituted an attempt by the Navy to strengthen right-wing elements in Germany. His articles briefly mentioned some of Lohmann's other activities, including subsidies to a boatbuilding yard, but only as attempts to help industries that had some war potential. One of his disclosures, however, had it been pursued, could have exposed most of Lohmann's work—his connections with the Berliner Bankverein.

Lohmann had bought a controlling interest in the Bankverein in March 1925 in order to use it as a covert financing agency for his projects. But the private bankers who remained shareholders were greatly displeased at the depreciation of its stock caused by failures such as that of the Berliner Bacon Company, and their discontent made them seri-

ous security risks. If any of them emulated the vindictive Isenburg and talked to the press, there was grave danger that the Lohmann affair might become not only a scandal but a revelation of serious German violations of the Versailles Treaty.

#### *Antidotes*

The German Cabinet and Chancellor Marx were therefore anxious to smooth the affair over as rapidly as possible. Lohmann was suspended from office, an official Cabinet inquiry was begun, and a retired official of the Prussian State judiciary was placed in charge of Lohmann's office for the purposes of investigation and audit. Publicity was curtailed and Wenkel silenced by pressure on the *Berliner Tageblatt*. Two radical journals continued to carry articles through late August, September, and October, but neither had good enough contacts in navy or industrial circles to make further damaging disclosures. Chancellor Marx consulted directly with various important party leaders to insure silence in political quarters.

In November the Cabinet began a series of meetings on the affair. As prophylactic action against future extravagant indiscretions by one individual or one component of the government, it decided to establish a "Supervisory Commission for the Secret Tasks of the Armed Forces" composed of the heads of the Army and Navy, the Reich Finance Minister, and the President of the General Accounting Office (*Rechnungshof*) to supervise and approve all clandestine projects of the services. Within the Navy a special "B" budget for funds diverted from publicly budgeted items was placed in the charge of a regular budget officer who had no authority to initiate or control projects. Although illegal operations were ultimately on a considerably larger scale than during the Lohmann era, rising from \$1,700,000 in 1928 to \$5,250,000 in 1933, there was no further abuse of the powers conferred by secrecy.

Lohmann, much in disfavor, was nevertheless punished only by forced retirement on a reduced pension. There seem to have been two reasons for this clemency—first, that extensive investigations showed he had not appropriated official funds for himself; and second, that an elaborate court-martial would have brought on the very thing the government wanted most to avoid, publicity which might disclose violations of the Ver-

sailles Treaty. Lohmann was a broken man, however, and he died only three years later of a heart attack. His widow had so little money that she was unable to pay the necessary inheritance taxes. Of Frau Ektimov's fate there is no word.

Before the Reichstag and the world public the Cabinet was able to obscure the fact that violations of the Versailles Treaty had occurred. The matter had to be brought to the Reichstag for approval of a special appropriation to pay off the government-guaranteed loans to Phoebus; but the Cabinet announced in advance the resignation of both Defense Minister Gessler and Navy commander Zenker, who, as Lohmann's superiors, had to accept responsibility for the scandal. In the Reichstag discussions the question of why Lohmann had engaged in such unusual activities was never fairly asked. Violation of the Treaty was charged only once, by the young and fanatical Communist deputy, Ernst Schneller, who declared correctly that Lohmann had been involved in submarine production in Spain. He ruined the effectiveness of an otherwise good case, however, by continuing with wild allegations that Germany's former enemies were assisting her in this work preparatory to a combined capitalist assault on that bastion of socialism, the U.S.S.R. This was such hackneyed tripe that the responsible German press did not bother to print his charges. The French news agency Havas carried them, but only in routine fashion and without comment.

Abroad, the fact that Lohmann's work violated the Versailles Treaty was completely missed by the press. Furthermore, the reports of the American Embassy in Berlin were brief and incurious regarding Lohmann's motives. British and French diplomatic reporting is not available, but an examination of the German Foreign Office records fails to disclose even a memorandum of conversation on the subject between these embassies and the Wilhelmstrasse. The conclusion seems inescapable that either the vaunted British and French intelligence services were caught napping, or, as seems more likely, the policy-makers in Paris and London chose to ignore the affair. To them the apparent collapse of the German Navy's efforts to circumvent the Treaty was perhaps a matter for quiet amusement rather than for alarm or indignation.

### COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS

Dear Sirs:

I have come across copies of correspondence which may be of interest in documenting Mr. Nabbie's article on "The Alamo Scouts" that appeared in the *Studies* Vol. III No. 4. Spanning a two-month interval from a fortnight before the Luzon landings to a fortnight after the retaking of Manila, they illustrate the evolution of official policy toward the Filipino guerrillas. The first statement of policy from MacArthur's headquarters was made in response to a Sixth Army request:

20 December 1944

Headquarters Sixth Army  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO 442

Subject: Official Recognition of Guerrillas  
To : Commander-In-Chief, South West Pacific Area, APO 500

1. Request that a directive be published clarifying the policy to be followed in extending official recognition to guerrilla units.
2. It is understood that to date no guerrilla forces on Luzon have been officially recognized by this theater.
3. Guerrilla groups on Mindanao, Leyte and Panay have been extended such recognition with consequent emolument in rank and pay. It is believed that unless some similar recognition is extended to a group or groups on Luzon, it may cause resentment and handicap the unification of the guerrilla forces there.

For the Commanding General:

G. H. DECKER  
Brigadier General, G. S. C.  
Chief of Staff

1st Ind.

General Headquarters, South West Pacific Area, APO 500,  
27 December 1944

To: Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, APO 442

1. The formal recognition of guerrilla units operating in Luzon present a very different problem than that prevailing on major islands to the South. Such action in the South resulted from an entirely different military situation than has existed under enemy occupation in Luzon. The vast areas, never under the physical occupation and control of the enemy in Mindanao, Panay and Negros, for example, permitted the organization and arming of

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regularized military forces and their commitment to guerrilla warfare, military intelligence and other interior activity under the direction of this Headquarters.

2. This was not possible in Luzon due to the widespread garrisoning of the area by vastly greater enemy occupying forces. As a consequence the resistance movement in Luzon has been confined to the classic type of underground operations in which an entire population, with little exception, has participated with patriotic fervor. These operations have extended into every center of enemy activity and have resulted in providing information in most precise and detailed form on enemy dispositions throughout the island.

3. It is anticipated that this great patriotic movement among the people of Luzon will reach its maximum strength and utility after the battle for Luzon has been joined and it is the desire of the Commander-in-Chief that it be utilized to maximum advantage.

4. The service, past and future, of unsundered, escaped or released members of USAFFE [United States Army Forces, Far East], will certainly ultimately be recognized on the merits of each case, as will the service of civilian patriotic secret societies, groups and individuals, but it is desired that for the purpose of the campaign the movement insofar as practicable be treated and directed as a spontaneous patriotic effort on the part of the whole people.

By Command of General MacArthur:

B. F. FITCH  
Brigadier General, U.S. Army  
Adjutant General

This position, although it was presumably the best that could be taken at the time, was not a very practical one. "A spontaneous patriotic effort on the part of the whole people" did not differentiate between Filipinos who trafficked with the Japanese and the guerrillas who had taken up arms, made sacrifices, and were living in the hills away from their families. It also gave no basis for defining the status of individual guerrilla leaders, where claims to authority were rife and assumed rank was the order of the day. (I personally met and was badgered by 20-year-old full colonels.) The unsundered Americans in the area (Volckmann,<sup>1</sup> O'Day, Barnett, Blackburn,<sup>2</sup> Calvert, and Murphy in north Luzon; Lapham, Anderson McKenzie and Ramsey in the central part; Barros in the south-

<sup>1</sup> See Russell W. Volckmann, *We Remained* (New York, 1954).

<sup>2</sup> See Philip Harkins, *Blackburn's Headhunters* (New York, 1955).



ern Bicol section) did do much to consolidate individual guerrilla units and define in some sort their areas of jurisdiction.

The subsequent regularizing of the guerrilla units as components of the Philippine Army which Mr. Nabbie describes from the Alamo Scout viewpoint was based on the following cable of 17 February 1945 from the Commanding General, Advance detachment, USAFFE, to the Commanding General, Sixth Army:

It is desired as rapidly as practicable to induct into the Philippine Army those guerrilla elements who have been or are being employed or whom you believe it is desirable to employ in support of our combat operations on Luzon. They may be inducted into service as groups or individually as you deem expedient. The mechanical process of such incorporation into service will be accomplished by you or your subordinate commander as you may direct, furnishing rosters and necessary data to the USAFFE Headquarters to perfect the official records. Officers and men not already in the Philippine Army by virtue of previous enlistment, induction or appointment will acquire the status of members of the Philippine Army as of the date of entry upon duty with pay according to Philippine Army scale commencing as of that date and without prejudice to prior service or claims. You are authorized to equip and supply these units as best you may.

The screening of guerrilla claims through personal inspection of the units by Alamo Scout officers behind the Japanese lines was probably effective in eliminating most of the Johnnie-come-lately's and others whose recognition was not warranted.

Henry G. Fishburn

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*The editors welcome the contribution of book reviews on subjects within the contributor's field of competence. Reviews, like manuscripts, should be typed in double space, and they should be headed with the bibliographical data in standard Studies format.*

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## INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

### ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERESPIONAGE

**THE PANTHER'S FEAST.** By Robert Asprey. (New York: Putnam. 1959. Pp. 317. \$5.00. Also London: Jonathan Cape. 1959.)

Robert Asprey's fictionalized life of Colonel Alfred Redl, Austrian counterintelligence genius and Russian agent within the Imperial General Staff before the first world war, makes little contribution to a professional understanding of this famous espionage case long cited, without detailed or adequate study, as a classic instance of the recruitment of a homosexual under threat of exposure. Yet if the jacket of the book (not an unbiased source) can be believed, Asprey has studied the files that survived Austrian efforts to suppress the Redl case as well as the inadequate and sensational literature that has grown up around it. He claims to have talked to survivors, including Redl's paramour Stefan, who were familiar with details. The end result should have been worthy of all this work.

Possibly it was. Asprey's first draft, a serious biography of Redl, was rewritten in its present form at the behest of his publishing agent, and the original manuscript destroyed. The result is neither sound biography nor good fiction, and it is essentially dishonest: it misleads the reader by combining fact and fantasy without discrimination. This deception is heightened by the inclusion of occasional footnote references to authorities (without citing specific pages) and a truly imposing bibliography. Unsuspecting readers may well accept as verified fact such sequences as Redl's meeting with the Italian military attaché in Vienna, completely fictional although Redl may indeed have sold information to both Italy and France. The "interpretive" invention of live dialogue protects the casual reader from boredom at the expense of the student who needs to get at the truth. Since the book market, to be sure, consists of many casual readers and relatively few students, writers and publishers who conspire to inflict "interpretive" biography on the public are not commercially at fault.

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In common with earlier writers on the case, Asprey trips over the hard fact that Redl, himself a Russian agent, continued to uncover and neutralize other Russian agents in Austria-Hungary. Asprey solves this problem through an imaginary face-to-face bargaining session between Redl and Batyushin, the Russian officer who is thought to have handled him. At this invented meeting Redl and Batyushin are shown arranging to sacrifice Russian agents in Austria as part of the payment to Redl. Asprey here follows without acknowledging his source a theory first developed by Tristan Busch in his *Secret Service Unmasked*,<sup>1</sup> but goes beyond Busch to suggest that more than one meeting was held. Only the German edition of Busch's work is listed in Asprey's bibliography. Busch, who claims a career in Austrian intelligence before and during the first world war, cites no authority for this doubtful story.

The true reason for this seeming inconsistency in Redl's actions was probably more prosaic: what better cover could he have than an active career as a catcher of Russian spies? Arrangements to sacrifice occasional Russian agents, if they were in fact made, could have been set up through whatever normal channels Redl had for passing messages and photographs to the Russians. (We know virtually nothing of these.) The Russian case officer, whatever his personal feelings, undoubtedly reconciled himself to the loss of a few minor agents if he could keep the big one securely hooked. Until evidence becomes available—and we know nothing of the Russian side of this case—the face-to-face meeting of Redl and Batyushin must be regarded as a myth. Indeed, until Russian files are opened, we can only speculate about Redl's motivation, the operational techniques he employed, and his true relationship to his Russian case officer.

At this late date, two great wars and half a troubled century later, why should overburdened American intelligence officers interest themselves in the uncertain career of a dimly remembered Austrian officer who was trapped into espionage by his homosexuality and a passion for luxurious living? What can the tragic story of Alfred Redl mean to us?

<sup>1</sup>Tristan Busch (pen name for Arthur Schuetz), *Secret Service Unmasked* (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.), pages 35-36.

We should remember, first of all, that the case of Alfred Redl forms part of the intelligence tradition of our Soviet adversary. The recruitment and direction of Redl shows a skill and daring that modern intelligence officers in their ignorance rarely grant to the services of Imperial Russia. The Soviets inherited no mean tradition in intelligence, and it is our business to know this background thoroughly. If this means a study of history—anathema among many American intelligence officers—we must make the best of it. How can we know the character of the enemy if we do not know his background and tradition?

It is a common American practice, one that shows through all our history, to judge events and activities primarily as successes or failures. This narrow pragmatic view is applied to our intelligence operations in an abnormal degree. If it succeeded, fine; if it failed, try something else. Almost no one bothers to ask why it succeeded or failed. The result is considerable groping in the murk. When the English indulge in this same practice we laugh and say they “muddle through.” Success and failure, however, are really not so simple. In every successful operation there are elements of failure, in each failure some success. If the Redl case can teach us anything, it teaches us the danger of brushing failures under the rug. No evidence now available indicates that Austrian counterintelligence ever tried to explore the ramifications of the case. Its criminal failure to interrogate Redl thoroughly before he was allowed to kill himself shows how eager it was to bury the case along with Redl and forget it. No vested interest should ever stand in the way of the investigation of operational failures.

The story of Colonel Redl is a magnificent case history in the seizure and manipulation of one human personality by another. Human motivation and the manipulation of personality to achieve desired ends is our eternal study. It is precisely here that Asprey fails us. When his book is finished we know something of Redl's glittering facade, but little of the man himself. Asprey was simply not up to this task. The career of Redl, in truth, is the subject for a great novelist. Any perceptive reader of *Darkness at Noon* is helped to fuller comprehension of the great Soviet purge trials, though Koest-

*Recent Books: Espionage*

ler's book is frankly fiction. It is a pity that no novelist of Koestler's stature has been attracted to Alfred Redl.

Redl's career illustrates for us once again the supreme irony of espionage: it is the unsuccessful agent who gains lasting fame. Nathan Hale and John André, both notoriously unsuccessful, are the two best remembered operatives of our own Revolutionary age. Alfred Redl has given his name to the classic case in which Colonel Batyushin, his supposed case officer, the truly successful man, is hardly remembered. Indeed, Colonel Batyushin was so successful that we cannot be certain he ever existed!

**COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE: Information, Espionage, and Decision Making.** Research report prepared by nine students at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration under the direction of *Georges F. Doriot*, Professor of Industrial Management. (Watertown, Mass.: C. I. Associates. 1959. Pp. 78. \$10.)

For all its arresting title and respectable sponsorship this brochure contributes little information not generally known about commercial espionage, and it treats its interesting subject in a gauche and superficial manner. The authors assume at the outset that the field of business intelligence systems is largely unexplored, and they appear to accept businessmen's own comments on their use of espionage at face value and without serious challenge.

The report, which tends to present espionage as a phenomenon peculiar to the postwar period of business in the United States, is based on interviews with business executives and responses to questionnaires sent U.S. industrial firms. The corporate responses suggest that all competitive intelligence systems were begot by the threat of penetration by other commercial espionage organizations, and that self-defense, being best served by a good offense, eventually required the introduction of the demobilized OSS officer or FBI agent as a professional commercial spy.

The brochure concludes with a recommended program of action which embraces the preparation of requirements, the exploitation of collection opportunities, collation and evalua-

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tion, the dissemination of finished intelligence, and its use in the decision-making process. The report contains no information of significance to the professional intelligence officer.

### RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

**THE GERMAN RESISTANCE:** Carl Goerdeler's Struggle Against Tyranny. By *Gerhard Ritter*. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1958. Pp. 330. 35/-.) Translated and abridged by R. T. Clark from the German *Carl Goerdeler und die Widerstandsbewegung* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1954). Published also in France as *Échec au Dictateur* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1956).

The intelligence officer who picks up this book expecting to learn how Carl Goerdeler, the heroic Lord Mayor of Leipzig, organized resistance against Hitler and the Nazis is doomed to disappointment. Professor Ritter, himself one of those arrested and imprisoned as holding anti-Nazi views, has devoted his work primarily to the political philosophies of the anti-Nazi elements, Goerdeler and other individuals and groups, including those in the Wehrmacht. While the book contains some pickings for the intelligence officer, the picking is not made the easier by Ritter's exhaustively discursive treatment.

The author does trace the origins of the opposition and resistance, describing in some detail the extensive travels Goerdeler undertook in trying to secure support from abroad as well as at home for the struggle against Hitler. He gives considerable space to the opposition in the Wehrmacht, which he shows to have been at its strongest under Beck's leadership before the occupation of Czechoslovakia and then to have waned in the face of Hitler's successful conquests, reviving only when it became apparent that Germany could not win the war. The Communists, according to Ritter, were unskillfully led and ineffective in their underground activity; their one large-scale venture, the Rote Kapelle espionage net, was not a resistance organization but one to serve the Soviet enemy. The Social Democrats went into exile. "It was in fact," Ritter writes, "only the churches which created a genuine popular movement against National Socialism." An important part was played by the Catholic labor movement.

Hans Oster, Admiral Canaris' deputy in the Abwehr, was the soul of the military opposition. Protected in his activity

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by Canaris and the successive chiefs of the General Staff, Beck and Halder, he was able to keep the opposition alive from 1933 until 1943, when his removal left Goerdeler with only Olbricht, Chief of Staff of the Army of the Interior, as military organizer. Graf Schenck Claus von Stauffenberg, the man whose bomb came closest to eliminating Hitler, is acknowledged to have been the one to act while the rest of the military only plotted; but Stauffenberg obviously does not stand high with Professor Ritter, who shows his sympathy with the belief of Goerdeler and many of the military that assassination was not the way to handle the evil Fuehrer.

The book gives peripheral treatment to the Kreisau circle or "Counts' Group" of Helmuth von Moltke and Peter Yorck von Wartenburg, describing principally its plans for a future Germany and comparing them with Goerdeler's. It also has only a few sentences on the contacts between Peter Kleist of Ribbentrop's staff and a Russian, identified only as Klauss, who conveyed purported Russian proposals for a separate peace.<sup>1</sup> Ritter throws doubt on the authenticity of these offers, but shows that they influenced some of the resistance groups to consider approaches to Stalin in 1944.

From the historical point of view, the reader of this book can but be left with the net impression that the German opposition—with the exception, to be sure, of a few high-principled men—found that it was able to tolerate Hitler as long as he was winning, and that by the time he was losing it was too late for them to act effectively.

SHAI: The Exploits of Hagana Intelligence. By Ephraim Dekel. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1959. Pp. 369. \$5.00.)

The SHAI was the intelligence arm of Hagana, the Zionist paramilitary organization which flourished underground in Palestine from the inauguration of the British Mandate Authority in 1921 to its termination shortly before the outbreak of the Arab-Jewish war in 1948. This account of its activities, like most popular treatments of intelligence subjects, leaves for the professional reader much to be desired. Although the

<sup>1</sup> See Kleist's *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin: 1939-45* (Bonn: Athenaem-Verlag, 1950).

author was an officer of the SHAI, and in spite of documentary garnishment with reproductions of official British CID reports and orders, the book fails to give any real insight into the organization, resources, and methods that lay behind the episodic series of exploits it narrates.

Much of this failing is apparently due to continuing security restrictions: the present Israeli intelligence service is the immediate lineal successor to the SHAI. Names of individuals and organizations are disguised or omitted; the reader learns only in a most general way in what headquarters these exploits were conceived and by what means successfully executed; the Jewish Agency nets in Europe and America, which furnished such active and important support for the underground, are never mentioned.

But the stories also bear the imprint of the author's exclusively Zionist perspective. His tone is strongly anti-British, less immoderately anti-Arab. He credits only the two or three British officers who showed their sympathy for the Jewish cause by turning informer. He projects sequences on SHAI operations in arms smuggling, protecting arms factories and caches, and introducing illegal immigrants in which the British Army, the Mandate Police, the CID, and MI-5 are repeatedly penetrated, outwitted, deceived, and circumvented until it is made to appear that the British either were imbeciles or just didn't care.

The Jews of Palestine during the Mandate period were an intelligent, homogeneous minority (several hundred thousand in a population of approximately a million and a quarter) with a passionate ideological motivation which can be compared only to that of the early Christians. The British, confronted with an extremely hostile Arab majority, were forced to rely inordinately on Jewish officials in their civil administration and in the police. The Jews, however, whether they were trusted officials of the Mandate government or police officers or just plain citizens, held their first loyalty to their own people. They would always give advance warning of impending British actions they learned about and would co-operate in deception and diversion to protect the underground activity. This situation, together with the low internal cohesion of the Mandate Authority and its doubtful morale,

made it an easy penetration target for the small, secretive, and beleaguered SHAI.

It was almost impossible, on the other hand, for the British to penetrate even small segments of the Jewish underground because of its tight loyalties and its rigorous internal security measures—compartmentation, the screening and testing of new members, physical protection for group assets, security of meetings, speedy communications, discipline and control of outside contacts, the threat of death to Jewish traitors and informers in or outside the organization, and lavish use of bribes and emoluments among Arabs and Gentiles. The hard-core action group was solidly backed by the general Jewish population, which looked to the SHAI and the Hagana for security. All this the author takes for granted in displaying the successes of the underground.

In spite of these weaknesses, *SHAI* does have specialized value as background for an understanding of the present Israeli intelligence service. It is also important reading for anyone who may be confronted with the problem of what can be done with—and what should not be attempted against—a small, fanatical, and absolutely loyal group of people bound together by ideology, religion, blood, and history, who know no other cause but their own.

GRIVAS: Portrait of a Terrorist. By *Dudley Barker*. (London: Cresset. 1959. Pp. 202. 21/—.)

GRIVAS AND THE STORY OF EOKA. By *W. Byford-Jones*. (London: Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 192. 21/—.)

In the eyes of most Britishers George Grivas, dedicated leader of the EOKA underground organization which held the island of Cyprus in turmoil for four years, terrorizing its whole population of half a million, is a frustrated and ruthless murderer. These two British authors, not surprisingly, share this view; but as factual accounts of the underground campaign, its aims, objectives, and methods, their books are most informative. Written soon after the demobilization of EOKA, the two tell essentially the same story in more or less the same way. Mr. Barker is more thorough in describing the intricacies of organization, techniques, and operations of the movement, whereas Mr. Byford-Jones' personal contacts

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with several key figures in the Cyprus campaign, including Grivas himself, add the authenticity and interest of first-hand experience.

It is ironic that the outcome of the successful terrorist campaign, prospective independence, was not its goal: Grivas had devoted his whole effort to the union of Cyprus with Greece. Cypriot-born professional soldier of the Royal Hellenic Army and a guerrilla leader during the war, having lost out in extreme right-wing postwar Greek politics and been relegated to inactivity, he turned to drawing up a plan for a private army to operate in the Cyprus mountains for the *enosis* cause. In this he was encouraged and sponsored by Archbishop Makarios III and the Cyprus Church. The Greek Church has for centuries kept nationalism alive in areas where Greeks are subject to foreign rule, and Cyprus had been a major target of its efforts.

It is made clear in these books that Grivas' aim was primarily to influence world opinion, to inflame a propaganda battle. Neither he and Makarios nor the Greek government imagined that the British could be driven from Cyprus by force, but they calculated that an armed Cypriot insurrection would convince world opinion that Cyprus was oppressed. That situation created, the Greek government could then exploit it in the United Nations.

For five years Grivas studied hard and carefully the organization and techniques of the Communist guerrilla forces in Greece. He was especially impressed by their practice of working through youth organizations and their ruthless pressure on the civil population. His plan for Cyprus was prepared in great detail. It was organized in three stages—first, sabotage plus rioting and insurrection by school children; second, assault and murder of pro-British Greek Cypriots; third, attacks on British soldiers and civilians. These steps were designed to inflame the youth, frighten ordinary Cypriots into expressing fervor for the cause, transform into national heroes any young EOKA gunmen that were caught, and lastly, provoke disciplinary and repressive measures by the British.

How Grivas kept the terrorist campaign going four years, eluding the 25,000-man British security forces, is thoroughly and chronologically described by both authors. With very

little real guerrilla fighting, the program was one of sabotage, ambush, assassination, and execution, mostly carried out by a small number of youths. Radio Athens poured out inflammatory propaganda, and the Church used spiritual sanctions to turn the faint-hearted into active supporters.

Both writers acknowledge that British ineptitude contributed to Grivas' success and the ease with which he evaded capture. The troops, especially in the early stages, were gullible and easily diverted. Cooperation between the troops and the police was lacking. Not until Field Marshal Sir John Harding took personal command were the anti-terrorist operations effective; and then Harding's vigorous measures brought precisely the reactions that best suited Grivas' purpose. Although they badly crippled the EOKA they made it easy for the resistance to present itself to world opinion as a national effort to attain freedom from an oppressor.

When Grivas' strategy succeeded and the U.N. General Assembly heard in February 1957 the Greek plea for Cypriot self-determination, Grivas seized upon the chance to reconstitute his decimated organization, offering to suspend violence as soon as the Archbishop was freed from exile. The British, in the face of the U.N. resolution, had no choice but to accept the truce. During the quiet which followed, Grivas recruited new EOKA leaders, formed new terrorist groups, continued smuggling arms, and taught his followers how to make home-made weapons. At about this time Harding was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot as Governor of Cyprus.

Foot was more competent in the propaganda field. He moved freely about the island, mingling with the Cypriots. He found the situation dangerous in two ways; conflict had arisen between EOKA and the left wing, and tension was mounting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. A Turkish resistance movement appeared and began intercommunal fighting to insure that Cyprus would not go wholly to Greece. Violence was no longer logically controlled. Murders and ambushes occurred without political objectives. In a last wave of assassination and terrorism in the autumn of 1958, EOKA attempted to regain the center of the stage through a harassing program of killing British soldiers.

When at the end of 1958 the Greek, Turkish, and British foreign ministers reached agreement on the creation of an independent Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, whom Grivas revered, assumed full responsibility, and Grivas reluctantly abandoned *enosis*. He left Cyprus for a briefly sustained hero's welcome in Greece, and he sits now in Athens, where Byford-Jones saw him as "the Lieutenant-General of the Royal Hellenic Army he had always wanted to be, bemedalled as any officer in the country, honored and yet feared. The picture I carried away with me when I left Greece was of a prematurely old, almost broken Grivas, a disappointment, a shock to anyone who had seen only the heroic photographs of him on his arrival. He was a man lost, spiritually alone. What is to become of him? Is the cycle to take a full turn? Is he again going to turn to politics as he did after his last illegal guerrilla adventure?"

### SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

IN THE NAME OF CONSCIENCE. By *Nikolai Khokhlov*. (New York: David McKay. 1959. Pp. 365. \$4.50.) Translated from the Russian *Pravo na Sovest* (Frankfurt: Possev Verlag, 1957.)

In this skillful translation, Khokhlov's moving personal memoirs—recounting his eager wartime enlistment into the NKVD, his training for a stay-behind operation in Moscow, his frustrations in deep-cover assignments, his partisan activities, his gradual postwar disaffection, his resolve to use an assassination assignment as a means of escape, and the tragic disappointments of his reception in the West—are changed only by the elimination of a few unessential passages and the addition of a postscript describing what he believes to have been a Soviet attempt in 1957 to poison him with radioactive thallium. A convincing and informative book for the lay reader, it slights details which would make it more valuable for the student of Soviet intelligence.

In describing Soviet intelligence, Khokhlov concentrates on personalities rather than structure. The reader cannot reconstruct with any assurance the organization of Directorate I (foreign intelligence) or the Partisan Directorate and its successors, in which Khokhlov was employed. During most of his intelligence career he was, to be sure, in staff agent status and presumably not very familiar with organizational details, but his long service enabled him to acquire some knowledge of his own component. This information is passed on to the reader in no organized form: data on organization is given only incidentally as required by the story. Personalities do make a story, however, and Khokhlov is best in describing such men as General Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, chief of the Partisan Directorate and its successor unit until 1953, and General Leonid Alexandrovich Eitingon, his deputy. Their subordinate officials are equally well portrayed. Reconstructed conversations, of which there are many in this book, must always be regarded with suspicion; but Khokhlov uses them well to acquaint the reader with the Soviet intelligence bureaucrat, both male and female.

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The story gives some data on agent training, unfortunately without much detail. It may be revealing that in late 1941, with the Germans in front of Moscow, time was taken to teach the stay-behind agents table manners; and that Khokhlov could be expected after three weeks' training, without knowledge of the language or country, to pass as a Pole in Rumania, where there were many Poles at the time. Khokhlov apparently experienced the hurry-up-and-wait phenomenon well known to soldiers and members of intelligence services: he cooled his heels for long periods of time in several countries, beginning with Rumania.

The time spent abroad doing nothing was not all lost, of course. Khokhlov seems to have had the misfortune to appear on the scene at just the time when Soviet intelligence recognized its lack of Soviet citizen agents who could pass as foreigners abroad, a lack with which the great purges of the late thirties probably had something to do. Undoubtedly we are seeing through Khokhlov's eyes the beginning of the shift in policy toward the use of Soviet citizens in illegal capacities abroad. Although some wartime successes with foreigners had been achieved—witness the Rote Drei in Switzerland—Soviet intelligence bureaucrats were probably conscious of the failures that had occurred and wanted to take advantage of the greater control that would result from the employment of Soviet citizens in deep-cover assignments. Khokhlov's mission to assassinate the NTS leader Okolovich is the only one thoroughly described, from planning to dispatch of the agents. Although many operational details are omitted even here, the reader gets an insight into Soviet planning, briefing, and training procedures.

If Khokhlov's story is true, he—almost uniquely among defectors—left the Soviet service for ideological, ethical, and patriotic reasons, in order to work with the NTS émigré organization for a better Soviet regime. His version, of course, cannot be fully checked; but it is notable also that while in the United States he would never accept any monetary compensation for his services. He made it a point to sign a receipt for any cash advanced him, and he always repaid the advances, being apparently reluctant to become indebted to the U.S. Government in any way. The least plausible aspect of his account, his misjudgment of the operational potential of the



NTS, which he was counting on to rescue his wife and child from Moscow, seems to have had some real basis in Soviet intelligence files.

If the Russian edition of Khokhlov's book is clandestinely circulating in the USSR, as he claims, his unfavorable description of American intelligence officers, their boorish conduct, rapacity, lack of depth and operational skill, and their inability to help him in any way, will not encourage defections to American intelligence. A poor impression of the State Department is conveyed, too: a daring plan to save Khokhlov's wife—by having our Moscow Embassy arrange that American correspondents go interview her at her apartment while Khokhlov's press conference was under way in Bonn—was rejected by the Embassy, apparently too late to stop the rather theatrically staged conference. Khokhlov's inability to achieve his objective of saving his wife and child is not surprising. His anger at the Americans may be considered a reflection of his bitterness at his own failure to comprehend the situation in the West.

**THE BRAIN-WASHING MACHINE.** By *Lajos Ruff*. (London: Robert Hale. 1959. Pp. 176. 16/-.)

**A STUDY IN INFAMY: The Operations of the Hungarian Secret police.** By *George Mikes*. (London: Andre Deutsch. 1959. Pp. 175. 15/-.)

*The Brain-Washing Machine* is the tale of a Hungarian refugee who had spent three years in the hands of the secret police. He emerged from this experience with a new theory of the Communist show trial and the abject confessions which are essential to it. These confessions are made possible, he asserts, by a "magic room" so designed as to drive its inhabitant into a state of schizophrenia.

Ruff says he spent six weeks in such a room. He describes in detail the lights which constantly revolved and threw kaleidoscopic patterns on the walls, the furniture so constructed as to make sleep or even comfort out of the question, the constant showing of surrealistic pornographic films, and the regularly administered injections of scopalamine and mescaline. Ruff himself managed to escape from the magic room, and did not come to trial. But he concludes that such a room

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must be the answer to the conundrum of the Communist confession, from the trials of Zinoviev and Kamenev to those of Rajk and Mindszenty.

The difficulty with Ruff's hypothesis is that his magic room explains altogether too much. It is not necessary to combine drugs, rotating lights, the showing of films, etc., to create illusory surroundings. Any *one* of these devices could usually accomplish the desired result. In some cases, in fact, schizophrenic reactions can be induced by simply reducing the level of sound in the prisoner's cell from a normal 75 to, say, 5 decibels. And if the AVH did not need such an elaborate magic room to induce schizophrenic reactions, we may doubt that such a room in fact existed. The AVH, moreover, or anyone charged with staging a show trial, would not find the production of artificial schizophrenia in a prisoner a very profitable technique. A schizophrenic prisoner is a prisoner out of control. His actions, whether before a court or elsewhere, would be unpredictable.

It thus seems likely that the magic room, far from serving to explain the Communist confession, is only the consequence of the experimental administration of mescaline to prisoner Ruff by the physicians of the AVH. Mescaline is the drug used by the Peruvian Indians to induce religious ecstasy, and Ruff's magic room has all the earmarks of a mescaline dream. This view of Ruff's room is all the more persuasive since so much else in his book is both sensational and difficult to document, as for instance his suggestion that a homosexual relationship existed between Matyas Rakosi and Janos Kadar.

Mikes' book is also disappointing. It is a summary of several issues of the *State Security Review*, house organ of the Hungarian secret police, together with a brief and not very perceptive history of the AVH itself. The *Review* was classified top secret and circulated among ranking AVH officers in only 210 copies. The issues which came into Mikes' possession discuss the recruitment of informers, particularly among intellectuals, the problems faced by principal agents, the establishment of safehouses, and the techniques of infiltration, surveillance, and censorship. But there is very little in all this which is not generally known in the intelligence community, and even to the reading public.

### PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

**THE WEAPON ON THE WALL:** Rethinking Psychological Warfare. By *Murray Dyer*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1959. Pp. 269. \$6.00.)

Spurred on by an avid interest and manifold experience in the communication of ideas in peace and war, Murray Dyer has written a thought-provoking review of our methods and policies in using the propaganda and psychological weapon. Taking a broader and more elevated view of psychological warfare than the black-art connotations of this term evoke, he prefers to speak of "political communication" and include in it the whole gamut of actions, policies, and attitudes, as well as words, which are used to influence the political behavior of others. Most of his book is nevertheless concerned with what we normally call propaganda.

Even without benefit of Mr. Dyer's broadened definition, the intelligence specialist can count the psychological warrior his most demanding customer. Planners and operators in the political, economic, or military field have intelligence requirements of a more or less well-defined scope and normally in sufficiently long term to give time for careful collation and evaluation. Psywar needs, on the other hand, cover the waterfront, and "crash" requirements are the rule: the psywar business is much like that of the newsman and public relations officer. *Weapon on the Wall* puts these needs into three teeming categories—knowledge of the psychological, political and economic climate; information on which the operator can select his targets and the time and means to attack them; and finally facts and estimates upon which to evaluate the impact of operations.

The author observes, however, that "political communication, as yet, cannot specify with precision the kinds of intelligence it needs and wants," and he calls for extensive research on psywar doctrine, techniques, planning, and evaluation. As an ex-psywarrior and intelligence officer, this reviewer submits that the inability to specify intelligence needs stems precisely from lack of doctrinal clarity among the political com-

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municators as to their role. Operators who differ on what their mission is will naturally differ as to the intelligence they need. This is what makes trouble for the intelligence supplier, adding confusion to what is at best a large and harassing order. Given consistent requirements, the flow of intelligence is likely to be troublesome chiefly in its abundance: requirements in the psywar field seem to fascinate collectors. During the war an Army G-2 who had been on psywar duty with the SHAEF was distressed to find that his conscientious spelling out of psywar requirements in the EEI for his POW interrogators produced the unhappy result that many of them spent more effort on this material than on order of battle.

Mr. Dyer's book, intended primarily for the makers and executors of high psychological policy, will give the intelligence officer a useful perspective on the needs of this customer of his as it outlines the dimensions of the customer's policy problem.

**THE EXECUTIVE OVERSEAS.** Administrative Attitudes and Relationships in a Foreign Culture. By *John Fayerweather*. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1959. Pp. 195. \$4.00.)

Although restricted to the special problems of business executives overseas and pertaining especially to the Mexican scene, this study makes a contribution to the embryonic but growing social science field devoted to the effectiveness of all kinds of American efforts abroad, a field particularly relevant to intelligence activities. The author, Associate Professor of International Business at Columbia University, interviewed 45 U.S. and six Mexican businessmen and conducted observations on the relationships among six U.S. and ten Mexican executives working with each other over a period of four months. He analyzes the resultant data, augmented by comparable observations from European, Indian, and other societies, in a framework of behavioral and social science concepts. Concentrating upon the achievement of understanding of the foreign national as the key to effectiveness in a foreign society, he makes his major contribution in presenting a methodology for working toward this goal.

Professor Fayerweather distinguishes five main problem areas—working relationships between men in a business or-

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ganization; individual attitudes towards innovation, analysis and action; basic motivations derived from the individual's objectives in life; difficulties in teaching foreign nationals American ways; and special problems arising from foreign nationals' attitudes toward Americans and the United States. He recognizes that all members of a national group are not identical in behavior, each being conditioned by his own unique combination of inner personal qualities and environmental conditions, but identifies different generic national approaches to business relationships. The American way, he says, produces a group-oriented personality disposed toward cooperation, confidence, fellow-feeling, mutual trust, and other qualities advantageous in the operation of a business organization. Other cultures produce an individualistic personality characterized by distrust, hostility, local loyalties, sense of separation, and authoritarianism, generally detrimental to organizational welfare.

The U.S. executive, however much he deplores the foreign deficiencies, is exhorted to handle them with enlightenment based on an understanding of their causes and the peculiarities of their manifestation in the particular society in question. The pattern of action suggested as applicable especially in Mexico is one of accommodation of American ways to those of the local scene, including more reliance on indirect communication in place of straight-to-the-point frankness, the adoption of local virtues—to become for example *simpático*, “making life pleasant with understanding,” and *sencillo*, “fitting into the local society in an unaffected way”—and an emphasis on personal relationships in business dealings.

This book is welcomed as a serious attempt to sensitize the American executive to many of the problems of interpersonal relations abroad. Looked at from the standpoint of the concepts and methods of the behavioral sciences, however, its shortcomings are evident. Its theoretical approach is one of rough and ready selection from currently popular concepts and a generally shallow application of them. It points out the surface manifestations of cultural interaction without any real attempt to get at the value premises that lie behind individual and group behavior: frameworks for studying value systems such as those presented by Cora DuBois, Margaret

Mead, and others are needed. Its definition of culture as "sets of customs" is essentially superficial, showing the lack of any comprehensive view of the structure and function of society and culture such as is given in the works of W. Lloyd Warner.

Professor Fayerweather uncritically assumes that American business methods are correct and good ways which should be imposed on backward societies. The assumption may be justified, but it would have less flavor of the "white man's burden" if works of specialists on cultural evolution, such as those of Robert Redfield on the urbanization of folk cultures, were taken into account. The modus operandi suggested for the U.S. executive, on the other hand, is presented too much as a surrender to local tradition rather than as a strategy of realistic maneuvering. The author's failure to make a scholarly approach through the materials of the social and behavioral sciences now available on his subject has resulted in a conglomeration of case-study data mixed with haphazard conceptual approaches and cultural analyses apt to be more confusing than enlightening to the serious student.

*The Executive Overseas* is not, then, a definitive study of overseas effectiveness even in the business field. But it is a readable and highly interesting introduction to some of the problems of working abroad, and it at least attempts to suggest a frame of mind conducive to their solution. In this sense it performs a valuable task in helping to open a critically important subject for investigation. It provides much thought-provoking material for more penetrating studies which, we hope, will follow.

Articles and book reviews on the following pages are unclassified and may for convenience be detached from the classified body of the *Studies* if their origin therein is protected. The authors of articles are identified in the table of contents preceding page 1.

The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelligence materials, and of the many intelligence officers who prepared book reviews for this issue of the *Studies*. Most noteworthy in this respect are the following:

Asprey's *The Panther's Feast* . . . . .

*Competitive Intelligence* . . . . .

Dekel's *SHAI* . . . . .

Books on Grivas and the EOKA . . . . .

Books on the Hungarian AVH . . . . .

Dyer's *Weapon on the Wall* . . . . .

Fayerweather's *Executive Overseas* . . . . .

Roger G. Seely

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